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CAN THE STATE PROCLAIM LIFE AFTER DEATH?




The United States Supreme Court dealt a significant blow to abortion 
opponents in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, but the 2016 ruling 
did not dampen their resolve. Just days after Texas lost the Hellerstedt
battle, the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) returned 
to the fight and proposed regulations requiring health care facilities to 
inter or cremate the remains of aborted and miscarried fetuses. 
Undeterred by a preliminary injunction entered against those regulations 
once they became final, the Texas legislature enacted a law with similar 
effect in June 2017.
The Texas law, however, proved to be good ground for yet another 
victory for those who advocate choice. Having already found the DSHS 
regulations wanting, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Texas enjoined the new statute, concluding that it was unlikely 
to survive the undue burden test that the Supreme Court set out in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has now 
followed suit with respect to an Indiana law regulating the disposition of 
fetal remains. But rather than applying Casey’s undue burden test, the 
appeals court determined that the Indiana statute could not survive even 
the very deferential rational basis standard of review. Importantly, the 
decisions of both the Texas district court and the Seventh Circuit conflict 
with a 1990 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit to uphold a Minnesota fetal remains disposition law—in a case 
tried before Roe v. Wade’s demanding trimester framework gave way to 
Casey’s more lenient undue burden standard. Thus, three federal courts 
are now in conflict, and the Supreme Court may need to step in yet again 
to decide who is right.
Unfortunately, Hellerstedt provides no easy answer to the question of 
whether fetal remains disposition requirements like those enacted in 
Texas and Indiana can survive constitutional challenge. The Texas 
legislation at issue in Hellerstedt purportedly advanced the state’s interest 
in safeguarding maternal health, and thus one questions how the 
Hellerstedt Court’s interpretation of Casey’s undue burden standard will 
apply to abortion regulations that are founded on the state’s interest in 
protecting potential life. What is certain, though, is that the Hellerstedt
Court did not overrule its decision either in Casey or in Gonzales v. 
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Carhart, both of which upheld measures aimed at encouraging a woman 
to choose childbirth over abortion. This Article thus contends that, when 
viewed in light of Casey and Gonzales, Hellerstedt’s interpretation of the 
undue burden test leaves states with a great deal of latitude to regulate 
abortion in a manner aimed at protecting potential life. As a result, efforts 
to regulate the method of disposing of fetal remains should pass 
constitutional muster.  
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INTRODUCTION
Abortion foes are relentless. Within days after Texas suffered defeat 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (Hellerstedt I),1 the state’s 
Department of State Health Services (DSHS) was at it again, proposing 
regulations that would require health care facilities to bury or cremate the 
remains of aborted and miscarried fetuses.2 Fetal remains disposition 
                                                                                                                     
1. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) [hereinafter Hellerstedt I] (concluding that Texas’s 
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements are unconstitutional).
2. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 222 (W.D. Tex. 2017) 
[hereinafter Hellerstedt II] (“Four days after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Whole 
2
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requirements were in the spotlight elsewhere on the same day when 
abortion providers brought a challenge to a 2016 Louisiana law.3 And just 
the day before, a federal district court had granted a preliminary 
injunction against a fetal remains disposition law that Vice President 
Mike Pence signed while he was Indiana’s governor.4
The flurry of activity surrounding fetal remains disposition 
requirements in the wake of Hellerstedt I may foretell a “brand-new 
front” in the battle over abortion.5 Thus far, however, it has not been a 
successful front for opponents of abortion. The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas has granted two preliminary 
injunctions against fetal remains disposition requirements—one in 
January 2017 with respect to regulations that DSHS ultimately adopted 
and another about a year later with respect to a June 2017 Texas statute 
that codified the substance of the DSHS regulations.6 In addition, the 
preliminary injunction that the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana had issued with respect to the Indiana law 
became permanent in September 2017, and in April 2018, the United 
                                                                                                                     
Woman’s Health, the first draft of the proposed [modifications to Texas regulations governing the 
disposition of fetal remains] was published.”).
3. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 
No. 16-CV-444/BAJ-RLB (M.D. La. July 1, 2016) (asserting that Louisiana’s fetal remains 
disposition requirement is unconstitutional).
4. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 194 F. Supp. 3d 818, 825, 834 
(S.D. Ind. 2016) (enjoining an Indiana fetal remains disposition requirement that was set to go 
into effect on July 1, 2016); Molly Redden, Texas Measure Requiring Burial of Fetal Remains 
May Herald a New Wave of Similar Laws, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/texas-fetal-remains-burial-cremation-law
(indicating that then-Governor Mike Pence had signed Indiana’s law).
5. Redden, supra note 4. For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term “fetal 
remains” to refer to all remains subject to the disposition requirements. The disposition 
requirements in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas, however, apply even to remains from an abortion 
that occurs before a fetus has developed. See IND. CODE § 16-18-2-128.7 (West 2016) (defining a 
“fetus” as “an unborn child, irrespective of gestational age or the duration of the pregnancy”); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.9(9) (West 2018) (defining an “unborn child” or “fetus” as “the unborn 
offspring of human beings from the moment of conception through pregnancy and until live 
birth”); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.132 (West 2018) (defining fetal tissue as “[a] fetus, body parts, 
or organs from a pregnancy”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 697.002 (West 2017)
(defining “embryonic and fetal tissue remains” as “an embryo, a fetus, body parts, or organs from 
a pregnancy that terminates in the death of the embryo or fetus and for which the issuance of a 
fetal death certificate is not required by state law”).
6. Compare 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1.136–1.137 (West 2018), with TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 697.002–796.004, 697.008 (West 2017). See 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 
441 (West 2017) (establishing requirements for the disposition of fetal remains); Hellerstedt II,
231 F. Supp. 3d at 233 (granting a preliminary injunction against the Texas regulations); 
Hellerstedt II, No. A-16-CA-1300, 2018 BL 30317, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter 
Hellerstedt II (order)] (enjoining the Texas statute).
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States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.7
The Texas district court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
(Hellerstedt II) and the Seventh Circuit in Planned Parenthood of Indiana 
and Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner (PPINK) were united in the view that 
a fetal remains disposition requirement cannot be justified based on what 
Roe v. Wade had recognized as the state’s “important and legitimate” 
interest in protecting potential life8 because the requirement applies after 
an abortion is completed, when no potential life remains.9 But the courts 
differed as to why injunctive relief was appropriate. While the Hellerstedt 
II court concluded that DSHS’s regulations and the Texas statute were 
unlikely to survive the undue burden standard adopted in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and later interpreted 
by the Hellerstedt I Court,10 the court in PPINK struck down Indiana’s 
fetal remains disposition law as an “arbitrary deprivation[] of liberty” 
rather than an undue burden.11 Both courts parted company with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which in Planned 
Parenthood of Minnesota v. Minnesota—before the Casey Court 
abandoned the rigorous post-Roe trimester framework in favor of the 
more forgiving undue burden standard—upheld a Minnesota fetal 
remains disposition requirement that looks much like the ones at issue in 
Hellerstedt II and PPINK.12 Thus, three federal courts have now 
                                                                                                                     
7. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 873 (S.D. 
Ind. 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 300, 310 (7th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter PPINK] (permanently enjoining 
Indiana’s fetal remains disposition requirement).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
9. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (“[S]tate and federal fetal homicide statutes, as well as state 
wrongful death statutes … seek to address a valid state interest in promoting respect for potential 
life. The fetal disposition provisions differ because there is no potential life at stake.”); Hellerstedt 
II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the State has an 
‘important and legitimate interest[ ] . . . in protecting the potentiality of human life [,]’ the 
Amendments do not further such a legitimate state interest [because they] regulate 
activities . . . that occur when there is no potential life to protect.”); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 
BL 30317, at *6 (“[T]here is no precedent showing expressing respect for the unborn by restricting 
[embryonic and fetal tissue remains] disposal after the potential for life no long exists is a valid 
state interest.”).
10. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228, 232 (explaining Hellerstedt I’s application 
of Casey’s undue burden standard and determining that the Texas regulations governing the 
disposition of fetal remains likely violated that standard); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, 
at *5 (“As recently confirmed by the Supreme Court, courts are to apply the ‘undue burden’ 
standard when evaluating potential restrictions on abortion access.” (citing Hellerstedt I)).
11. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 307.
12. See Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minn., 910 F.2d 479, 481 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding a Minnesota statute requiring remains from an abortion or miscarriage to be disposed 
of “by cremation, interment by burial, or in a manner directed by the commissioner of health); 
infra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (discussing Casey and Roe’s trimester framework).
4
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expressed divergent views as to the constitutionality of similar fetal 
remains disposition requirements. Given this split, the Supreme Court 
may need to weigh in—again.13
This Article analyzes whether fetal remains disposition requirements 
like those recently adopted in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas 
unconstitutionally infringe on the right to choose that the Court first 
recognized in Roe.14 Part I of this Article discusses the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota and recounts other pre-
Casey challenges to measures governing the disposition of fetal remains. 
Part II turns to Casey and Hellerstedt I and offers an in-depth analysis of 
what Hellerstedt I’s interpretation of Casey’s undue burden test means 
for abortion regulations designed to advance the state’s substantial 
interest in protecting potential life. Part III then critically examines the 
recent challenges to the Indiana and Texas fetal remains disposition 
requirements in PPINK and Hellerstedt II. After describing the reasoning 
that the Seventh Circuit and the Texas district court employed, Part III
explains the serious missteps the two courts made. Among other things, 
Part III contends that both courts went off course by failing to appreciate 
the relationship between Hellerstedt I, Casey, and Gonzales v. Carhart,15
the Court’s 2007 decision upholding the federal partial-birth abortion 
ban, and the way in which fetal remains disposition requirements serve 
the government’s interest in protecting potential life notwithstanding 
their direct application to fetuses who no longer have that potential. Part
III concludes by evaluating how Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition 
statute stands up to constitutional challenge.16
                                                                                                                     
13. Alexandra Zavis, The Latest Battlefront in the Abortion Wars: Some States Want to 
Require Burial or Cremation for Fetuses, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-aborted-fetus-burial-2017-story.html [https://perma.cc/B5BQ-2YHL] (“[L]egal 
battles over the new regulations are likely to be long and could wind up before the Supreme 
Court.” (citing a Wake Forest University law professor)).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (“We . . . conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the 
abortion decision . . . .”). This Article considers the constitutionality of new laws that restrict the 
methods that may be used to dispose of fetal remains. It does not address the validity of laws that 
regulate other aspects of the disposition of fetal remains without altering the permissible 
disposition methods. For example, this Article does not give detailed attention to recent Arkansas 
legislation that dictates who may direct the final disposition of a dead fetus. See 2017 Ark. Acts
603 (amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-801(b)(1)(B) to require the disposition of a dead fetus 
in accordance with the Arkansas Final Disposition Rights Act of 2009). While the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted a preliminary injunction against the Arkansas 
law under Casey’s undue burden test, it also indicated that the law “does not specify any new 
method of disposal.” Hopkins v. Jegley, F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1069, 1104 (E.D. Ark. 2017).
15. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the federal partial-birth 
abortion ban).
16. The defendants in the Louisiana action agreed not to enforce that state’s fetal disposition 
requirement pending a ruling by the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
5
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This Article concludes that, although Hellerstedt I was a setback for 
abortion opponents, states continue to have broad latitude to adopt 
abortion regulations aimed at protecting potential life and, consequently, 
fetal remains disposition requirements like those adopted in Indiana and 
Texas are apt to be upheld. States that adopt these requirements express 
“profound respect for the life of the unborn”17 by proclaiming that what 
is now dead was, at one time, a living human being. To be sure, this 
proclamation comes too late to protect fetuses to whom the requirements 
directly apply, but the very existence of the requirements delivers a 
message that might persuade some women to choose childbirth over 
abortion.18 And even after Hellerstedt I, that is enough.   
I. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MINNESOTA AND OTHER PRE-CASEY
CHALLENGES TO FETAL REMAINS DISPOSITION REGULATIONS
Regulations governing the disposition of fetal remains are not new. 
Less than two years after the Court handed down Roe,19 Pennsylvania 
enacted a statute requiring its Department of Health to “make regulations
to provide for the humane disposition of dead fetuses.”20 In Planned 
Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick,21 a decision the Supreme Court affirmed 
without opinion,22 the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania upheld the law against a facial challenge, deciding that a 
state can exercise its police power to regulate the disposition of fetuses in 
a manner designed to protect public health. 23 Pennsylvania persuaded the 
court that it sought only “to preclude the mindless dumping of aborted 
fetuses on to garbage piles,”24 and while the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the fetal remains disposition statute unconstitutionally 
burdened a woman’s right to choose by allowing health department 
regulations that might place financial and psychological burdens on 
                                                                                                                     
Louisiana on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and the district court has not yet 
rendered a decision. See Joint Stipulation for Non-Enforcement as to Plaintiffs and Proposed 
Order, at 1, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016) (No. 16-CV-00444/BAJ-RLB)
(including the defendants’ agreement not to enforce Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition statute).
17. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
18. See id. at 877–78 (indicating that unless it represents a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
“right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will 
be upheld if reasonably related to that goal”).
19. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 599 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
(indicating that the Pennsylvania requirement was enacted on September 10, 1974).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 428 U.S. 901, 901 (1976).
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women seeking first or second trimester abortions and might require 
“treating the fetus as a human,”25 the court did not foreclose a later 
challenge to the extent that an underlying regulation would “invade the 
privacy of [a] pregnant woman and burden her decision concerning 
abortion.”26
Just a few years later, in Margaret S. v. Edwards,27 the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana found that a Louisiana 
statute did just that.28 The statute at issue in Edwards directed abortion 
doctors to ensure that fetal remains were disposed of in accordance with 
the state’s laws governing the disposition of human remains in general—
laws which required that the remains of a deceased child be “decently 
interred or cremated” and that the child’s parents choose between the 
two.29 According to the Edwards court, Louisiana’s fetal remains 
disposition statute unconstitutionally burdened a woman’s right to choose 
abortion by “requir[ing] that fetal remains be treated with the same 
dignity as the remains of a person.”30 In reaching its decision, the court 
insisted that Roe barred Louisiana from deciding when life begins and 
that asking a woman to choose the method of disposition creates 
psychological burdens because the “question equates the abortion process 
with the taking of a human life.”31 Moreover, the court speculated, 
because Louisiana law gave both parents the right to direct the disposition 
of a deceased child’s remains, the challenged fetal remains disposition 
requirement might burden the abortion decision by requiring a woman to 
consult with the aborted fetus’s father.32
In Leigh v. Olson,33 on the other hand, the United States District Court 
for the District of North Dakota found a North Dakota statute similar to 
the one at issue in Fitzpatrick to be rationally related to the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting public health and therefore facially 
valid.34 The court also determined, however, that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied, because regulations adopted under statutory 
authority required a woman or her “next of kin” to direct the manner of 
                                                                                                                     
25. Id. at 572.
26. Id. at 573. 
27. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
28. See id. at 223 (striking down a Louisiana fetal remains disposition requirement).
29. Id. at 221–22 (describing the effect of Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition 
requirement).
30. Id. at 222.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 222 n.132 (discussing the potential effect of the father’s involvement). 
33. 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351 (D.N.D. 1980).
34. The North Dakota law required that a fetus “be disposed of in a humane fashion under 
regulations adopted by the state department of health.” Leigh, 497 F. Supp. at 1351 (finding the 
North Dakota Statute facially constitutional).
7
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disposal of an aborted fetus.35 According to the court, requiring a woman 
to choose the manner of disposal directly burdened her decision to have 
an abortion and did not advance the state’s interest in protecting potential 
life or its interest in safeguarding maternal health.36
Like the district court in Olson, the Supreme Court in City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.37 faced a fetal remains 
disposition requirement similar to the Pennsylvania statute upheld in 
Fitzpatrick. This time, the Court struck down the requirement as facially 
invalid.38 The Court, though, did not find that the requirement imposed 
an impermissible burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion, but 
concluded instead that it was unconstitutionally vague.39
The measure at issue in Akron was a city ordinance that required the 
disposition of fetal remains “in a humane and sanitary manner,” but 
unlike the statute in Fitzpatrick, the ordinance imposed criminal penalties
for violations.40 In deciding that the ordinance was unconstitutional, the 
Court indicated that the word “humane” might suggest an “intent to 
‘mandate some sort of “decent burial” of an embryo at the earliest stages 
of formation[,]’”41 and that, because violations gave rise to criminal 
sanctions, the Constitution would not tolerate the uncertainty that the 
language created.42 Nevertheless, the Court indicated in a footnote that 
“Akron remain[ed] free … to enact more carefully drawn regulations that 
further its legitimate interest in proper disposal of fetal remains.”43
After suffering defeat in Edwards, Louisiana adopted what it may 
have thought was a “more carefully drawn” fetal remains disposition 
requirement. According to the district court in Margaret S. v. Treen,44
however, the new law still fell short of constitutional standards. 45 Rather 
than forcing abortion doctors in all cases to treat fetal remains in the same 
manner as the state required for other human remains,46 the new statute 
directed a physician performing an abortion for a woman to notify her 
                                                                                                                     
35. See id. at 1352 (finding the North Dakota statute “unconstitutional as applied”).
36. See id. at 1351.
37. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992).
38. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 (determining that an Akron ordinance was invalid).
39. See id. at 451 (affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit that the Akron ordinance was unconstitutionally vague).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 451 n.44.
43. Id. at 451 n.45.
44. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
45. See id. at 671 (“[I]t is this Court’s holding that [the fetal remains disposition law] is 
unconstitutional.”).
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of the statute struck 
down in Edwards).
8
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(within 24 hours after the abortion) of the requirements of law regarding
disposal of the “remains of the child”47 and, based on the Treen court’s 
reading, mandated disposition of the fetus by burial or cremation if the 
woman so chose.48
The new Louisiana statute, the court in Treen determined, raised a 
host of problems. First, the court indicated that by requiring a woman to 
be notified regarding how “the remains of the child” were to be disposed 
of, the statute impermissibly equated a fetus with a born human person.49
Second, the court contended that the law imposed “psychological 
burdens” on women by suggesting that the state “equates abortion with 
the taking of a human life” and that it did not matter that a woman would 
not be provided with information about disposition of the fetus until after 
her abortion had been completed.50 Third, the court added, the disposition 
requirement interfered with the physician–patient relationship because it 
required a physician to inform a woman about the disposition of fetal 
remains even if the physician judged that providing the information 
would be harmful to the woman.51 Finally, the court concluded that 
neither an interest in protecting public health nor an interest in respecting 
the rights of patients who had particular views about the disposition of 
fetal remains was “sufficiently compelling” to justify the Louisiana 
statute’s burdens.52 In fact, according to the Treen court, the statute 
served “no state interest whatsoever.”53
Unlike the Louisiana statute at issue in Treen, the Minnesota fetal 
remains disposition requirement that the Eighth Circuit upheld in 
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota—and that is still in place today—does 
not require a woman who has an abortion to be involved in the disposition 
of the aborted fetus’s remains.54 Instead, the Minnesota law simply 
provides that health care facilities must dispose of the remains from 
abortions and miscarriages by means of “cremation, interment by burial, 
or in a manner directed by the commissioner of health.”55 This 
requirement, the Eighth Circuit concluded, satisfies constitutional norms 
because it is reasonably related to the state’s “interest in protecting public 
                                                                                                                     
47. Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 668–69.
48. See id. at 669 (presuming that the requirement that fetal remains be treated in the same 
manner as other remains would arise “at the behest of the woman”).
49. Id. at 670.
50. Id. at 670–71.
51. Id. at 671.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minn., 910 F.2d 479, 486–87 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The 
woman need not be told of the disposition means, and indeed, she need not be consulted about the 
particular provider’s choice for disposition.”).
55. Id. at 481 n.2.
9
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sensibilities,” an interest Planned Parenthood acknowledged as 
legitimate.56
Notably, the Eighth Circuit determined that the Minnesota statute 
“d[id] not burden the abortion choice” and therefore was not subject to 
review as an abortion regulation.57 In reaching this decision, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that increased costs resulting from the 
Minnesota statute and related adverse psychological effects on women
represented impermissible burdens.58 As to costs, the Eighth Circuit 
observed that the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood Association of 
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft59 had concluded that an increase in 
costs of up to $19.40 per patient did not give rise to an unconstitutional 
burden, and the evidence indicated that the increase resulting from the 
Minnesota statute would be far less.60 In addition, the court decided that 
the Minnesota law does not impose a “psychological burden” on women 
because it does not require a woman’s input in connection with the 
disposition of fetal remains.61 Moreover, the court dismissed Planned 
Parenthood’s suggestion that Minnesota intended to convey through the 
statute the state’s view that “fetal remains are the equivalent of human 
remains.”62 According to the court, even if this were the purpose, the 
legislation would stand because “[a] state may make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion.”63
Having decided that the Minnesota statute does not burden a woman’s 
ability to choose abortion, the Eighth Circuit then turned to the district 
                                                                                                                     
56. Id. at 487–88. By citing Maher v. Roe, Harris v. McRae, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery, and Plyler v. Doe, the court appears to have applied rational basis review in reaching 
this conclusion. See Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d at 486, 487–88 (citing Maher v. Roe, 
432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980); Minn. v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). The court 
also cites Akron and Ashcroft, however, each of which employs a standard of review that is not 
so deferential. See Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d at 486, 487 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 
429, and Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 489–90); Akron, 462 U.S. at 430 (noting that, in previously 
upholding abortion regulations that did not have a significant impact on a woman’s ability to 
choose abortion, “[t]he decisive factor was that the State met its burden of demonstrating that 
the[] regulations furthered important health-related State interests”); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 489–
90 (balancing the burdens and benefits of an abortion regulation).
57. The Eighth Circuit suggested that, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 
490 (1989), the Supreme Court may have jettisoned strict scrutiny in favor of “a less rigorous 
standard of review” for abortion regulations. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d at 486. 
58. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d at 486–87.
59. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
60. Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d at 487.
61. See id. at 486–87 (“The woman need not be told of the disposition means, and indeed, 
she need not be consulted about the particular provider’s choice for disposition.”).
62. Id. at 487.
63. Id. (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 506).
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court’s conclusion that the law could not survive even deferential rational 
basis review because it was both underinclusive and overinclusive.64 The 
law’s failure to address abortions or miscarriages in which a fetus is 
delivered outside a health care facility, the court indicated, did not make 
the law impermissibly underinclusive because regulating activity inside 
the home raises “privacy concerns.”65 Furthermore, the court rejected the 
claim that the statute was overinclusive, explaining that, to advance its 
interest in protecting public sensibilities, the state could reasonably have 
decided to include both miscarriages and abortions because they both 
result in the delivery of fetal remains requiring disposal.66 Therefore, the 
court decided, Minnesota’s fetal remains disposition requirement “fall[s] 
within the permissible boundaries” the Supreme Court had established.67
II. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD AND THE STATE’S INTEREST IN 
PROTECTING POTENTIAL LIFE
A. Casey and Hellerstedt I
When the Eighth Circuit confirmed Minnesota’s right to prefer 
childbirth over abortion, it relied on the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision 
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services68 and expressed a principle 
that would later feature prominently in Casey.69 But to understand why 
the Casey Court emphasized this principle, one must first return to Roe.
The Court in Roe recognized three interests that may justify regulating 
abortion: an interest in maintaining standards for the medical profession, 
an interest in safeguarding maternal health, and an interest in protecting 
                                                                                                                     
64. See id. (“The district court . . . concluded that . . . [the statute] was not rationally related 
to any legitimate governmental interest.”). 
65. Id. at 488.
66. See id. (discussing the district court’s conclusion that the statute is overinclusive).
67. Id.
68. 492 U.S. 490 (1989); see Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 910 F.2d.at 487 (citing 
Webster, 492 U.S. at 506).
69. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (“‘[T]he 
Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a 
preference for normal childbirth.’”) (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 511); id. at 878 (“[A] state 
measure designed to persuade [a woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if 
reasonably related to that goal.”); id. (“[M]easures designed to advance [the State’s profound 
interest in potential life] will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman 
to choose childbirth over abortion.”); id. at 883 (“[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal 
of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is 
mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over 
abortion.”); id. at 886 (“[U]nder the undue burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive 
measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health 
interest.”).
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potential life.70 Those interests—and the Court’s view of their strength at 
various points during pregnancy—served as the basis for the familiar 
trimester framework that courts used to assess abortion regulations during 
the period following Roe.71 Under that framework,
almost no regulation at all [was] permitted during the first 
trimester of pregnancy; regulations designed to protect the 
woman’s health, but not to further the State’s interest in 
potential life, [were] permitted during the second trimester; 
and during the third trimester, when the fetus is viable, 
prohibitions [were] permitted provided the life or health of 
the mother is not at stake.72
The trimester framework applied for almost 20 years, until the Casey 
Court rejected it as inconsistent “with the holding in Roe itself” because 
it undervalued a state’s interest in protecting potential life,73 an interest 
Roe recognizes as “important and legitimate” and Casey describes as 
“substantial” and “profound.”74 Accordingly, while the Court in Casey
retained viability as the point at which a state’s ability to regulate abortion 
is the most robust,75 it abandoned the “rigid” trimester framework76 and 
adopted an “undue burden” standard for abortion regulations that apply 
before viability.77 In minting this new standard, the Court explained:   
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the 
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose 
is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further 
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the 
woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, 
while furthering the interest in potential life or some other 
valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be 
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate 
ends. . . . Unless it has that effect . . ., a state measure 
                                                                                                                     
70. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (identifying government interests in regulating abortion). 
71. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (discussing Roe’s trimester framework). 
72. Id.
73. See id. at 876 (“Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental 
attempts to influence a woman’s decision on behalf of the potential life within her as unwarranted. 
This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a substantial 
state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”).
74. Id. at 875–76, 878 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162).
75. Id. at 872.
76. Id. at 873.
77. See id. at 876 (“[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling 
the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
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designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion 
will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations 
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion 
are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.78
Applying the undue burden standard, the Court upheld nearly every 
aspect of the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey, including informed 
consent provisions, a 24-hour waiting period, a parental consent 
requirement, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements.79 The only 
provisions that the Court struck down were those with respect to spousal 
notification.80
Nearly 25 years later in Hellerstedt I, a Texas statute did not fare quite 
so well. Under the statute, Texas had required (1) a physician performing 
an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of 
the facility in which the abortion was to be performed and (2) abortion 
facilities to comply with standards applicable to ambulatory surgery 
centers operating in the state.81 The Court struck down both 
requirements.82 In so doing, the Court indicated that 
“Casey . . . requires . . . courts [to] consider the burdens a law imposes on 
abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer 
[and] . . . whether any burden imposed on abortion access is “undue.” 83
The Court added that evaluating abortion regulations requires a more 
searching review than applies under a traditional rational basis standard, 
which calls for nothing more than a “reasonably conceivable state of 
facts” that might support the regulation.84 Furthermore, according to the 
Court, when subjected to a more demanding review, Texas’s admitting 
privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements did not measure 
up to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
                                                                                                                     
78. Id. at 877–78.
79. See id. at 887, 899, 900 (concluding that various Pennsylvania abortion regulations are 
constitutional). 
80. See id. at 898, 901 (invalidating Pennsylvania spousal notification provisions and a 
related reporting requirement).
81. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (Hellerstedt I), 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) 
(describing the provisions of the Texas statute at issue in the case).
82. Id. at 2300. 
83. Id. at 2309–10.
84. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The Court in Hellerstedt I rebuked U.S. Court 
of Appeals for applying the traditional rational basis standard normally applicable to economic 
regulations such as those at issue in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. See Hellerstedt I, 136 
U.S. at 2309 (“And the second part of the test [the Fifth Circuit used] is wrong to equate the 
judicial review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with 
the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.” (citing 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). The Court in Williamson
explained that “it [was] for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages” of the law at issue in the case. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
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As to any benefits associated with the Texas law, the Court noted that 
Texas’s admitting privileges requirement was intended to make abortion 
safer by facilitating access to a hospital if a woman has complications 
from the procedure.85 The record, the Court insisted, indicated that the 
requirement offered no significant benefit in this regard.86 In particular, 
the Court cited expert testimony and other evidence suggesting that 
abortion is “extremely safe” in Texas, and the Court observed that Texas 
had not shown that the admitting privileges requirement “would have 
helped even one woman obtain better treatment.”87 Indeed, the Court 
stated that it “found nothing . . . that show[ed] that . . . the [requirement]
advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health.”88
On the other hand, the Court concluded that the admitting privileges 
requirement imposed significant burdens on women seeking abortions.89
In reaching that conclusion, the Court credited evidence that, around the 
time the admitting privileges requirement went into effect, approximately 
20 abortion facilities closed, thereby decreasing access to abortion and 
creating other adverse consequences: “In our view, the record contains 
sufficient evidence that the admitting-privileges requirement led to the 
closure of half of Texas’[s] clinics, or thereabouts. Those closures meant 
fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding.”90 The 
Court observed that the closures also resulted in greater driving distances 
for women seeking abortions, and while the Court “recognize[d] that 
increased driving distances do not always constitute an ‘undue burden,’” 
it found that they were “but one additional burden, which, when taken 
together with others . . . and when viewed in light of the virtual absence 
of any health benefit, . . . support[ed] the District Court’s ‘undue burden’
conclusion.”91
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to Texas’s 
ambulatory surgery center requirement.92 Highlighting evidence 
indicating that abortion is safer than other procedures that are not required 
to be performed in an ambulatory surgery center, the Court found “that 
the surgical-center provision impose[d] ‘a requirement that simply is not 
                                                                                                                     
85. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2311–12.
88. Id. at 2311.
89. Id. at 2312 (“At the same time, the record evidence indicates that the admitting-
privileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice.’” (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992))).
90. Id. at 2313.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 2318 (“[T]he surgical-center requirement . . . provides few, if any, health 
benefits for women, poses a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions, and constitutes an 
‘undue burden.’”).
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based on differences’ between abortion and other surgical procedures 
‘that are reasonably related to’ preserving women’s health, the asserted 
‘purpos[e] of the Act in which it is found.’”93 Moreover, the Court 
emphasized that the record offered “sufficient support for the more 
general conclusion that the surgical-center requirement ‘will not 
[provide] better care or . . . more frequent positive outcomes.’”94
In addition, just as with the admitting privileges provision, the Court 
found that the ambulatory surgery center requirement imposed 
disproportionate burdens on abortion access. Of particular concern to the 
Court was the stipulated fact that the ambulatory surgery center 
requirement would increase the number of abortion facility closures even 
more, leaving the state with only seven or eight such facilities.95 As to the 
closures, the Court endorsed the district court’s reliance on a single expert 
who testified that it was unlikely that the remaining facilities would be 
able to meet the demand for abortion services.96 Furthermore, the Court 
cited “common sense” that existing facilities designed to meet a certain 
level of demand will not be able to meet five times that level of demand 
“without expanding or otherwise incurring significant costs.”97 And again 
the Court pointed out possible collateral effects that could result from 
clinic closures—even if remaining facilities could meet demand:
Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get 
abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. 
Patients . . . are less likely to get the kind of individualized 
attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that 
doctors at less taxed facilities may have 
offered. . . . Surgical centers attempting to accommodate 
sudden, vastly increased demand may find that quality of 
care declines.98
Thus, with “few, if any, health benefits for women,” the Court 
concluded that the “the surgical-center requirement, like the admitting-
privileges requirement, . . . pose[d] a substantial obstacle to women 
seeking abortions, and constitute[d] an “undue burden” on their 
constitutional right to do so.”99
                                                                                                                     
93. Id. at 2315.
94. Id. at 2316.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2317.
98. Id. at 2318.
99. Id.
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B. Placing the State’s Interest in Protecting Potential Life on the Scale
In reaching its decision in Hellerstedt I, the Court assumed that 
Texas’s admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements 
were aimed at protecting maternal health100 and not at either of the other 
governmental interests (protecting potential life and maintaining medical 
standards) that the Court in Roe identified.101 As a result, it is unclear as 
to whether and how the balancing test found in Hellerstedt I might apply 
to regulations—like fetal remains disposition requirements—that
advance the state’s “substantial interest in potential life.”102 What is clear, 
however, is that the Court in Hellerstedt I did not overrule Casey or 
Gonzales, but merely interpreted Casey’s undue burden standard.103
Thus, when considering measures designed to serve the state’s interest in 
protecting potential life, one must look to how the Court in Casey treated 
those parts of the Pennsylvania statute sustained based on that interest 
and what led the Court in Gonzales to uphold the federal partial-birth
abortion ban.
Notably, in concluding that Casey’s undue burden standard is a 
balancing test, the Court in Hellerstedt I only cited the Casey Court’s
analysis regarding the spousal notification and parental consent 
provisions that were at issue.104 And Casey’s discussion of neither 
provision focuses on the state’s interest in protecting potential life. 
Instead, to the extent that the Casey Court was balancing the benefits and 
burdens of these provisions, it was considering other interests. 
With respect to the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision, the 
Court in Casey considered the benefits to the husband and his interest in 
potential life against the burdens the notification requirement imposed on 
his wife.105 In addition, the Casey Court relied on Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth,106 a case in which it had considered a 
spousal consent requirement relative to “the interest of the state in 
protecting the mutuality of decisions vital to the marriage 
                                                                                                                     
100. See id. at 2310 (“[O]ne is left to infer that the legislature sought to further a 
constitutionally acceptable objective (namely, protected women’s health).”). 
101. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (listing the governmental interests Roe 
recognized).
102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
103. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (“We must here decide whether two provisions of 
Texas’ House Bill 2 violate the Federal Constitution as interpreted in Casey.”).
104. See id. at 2309 (describing Casey’s undue burden test as a balancing test).
105. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896–98 (noting the husband’s interest and indicating that the 
Court held in Danforth that “the balance weighs in [the wife’s] favor”).
106. Id. at 897 (“The principles that guided the Court in Danforth should be our guides 
today.”).
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/4
2018] REGULATING THE DISPOSITION OF FETAL REMAINS 1063
relationship.”107 In Danforth, of course, the Court would not have given 
any weight to the state’s interest in protecting potential life because the 
consent requirement applied during the first trimester of pregnancy, the 
period in which Roe’s trimester framework demanded that “the abortion 
decision and its effectuation . . . be left to the medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”108
Casey’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement 
similarly involves no consideration of the state’s interest potential life.109
                                                                                                                     
107. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. V. Danforth, 392 F. Supp 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
108. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164). Roe suggests that only in the 
third trimester does the state’s interest in protecting potential life become strong enough to serve 
as a basis for abortion regulation. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65 (“For the stage subsequent to 
viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, 
regulate . . . abortion.”). It was not until 1992 that the Court in Casey abandoned this far-reaching
prohibition, concluding that Roe’s “essential holding” was that the state’s interest in protecting 
potential life is not strong enough to justify pre-viability regulations that impose a substantial 
obstacle on the ability of a woman to choose abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Before 
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the 
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”). 
109. In setting out “guiding principles” for the undue burden standard, the Court in Casey
indicated that a state may “create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or 
guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn . . . , if [the mechanism 
is] not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 
877. But neither those “guiding principles” nor Casey’s specific consideration of Pennsylvania’s 
parental consent requirement indicates that such a requirement is justified based on the state’s 
interest in potential life.
Moreover, when evaluating parental consent and notification requirements, the Court and 
individual justices have historically focused on the state’s interests in protecting the integrity of 
the family, protecting pregnant minors, and protecting the interests of parents.  See Akron, 497 
U.S. at 520 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (concluding that an Ohio parental consent statute did not 
pose an undue burden on a minor’s ability to choose abortion and indicating that “[i]t would deny 
all dignity to the family to say that the State cannot take this reasonable step in regulating its 
health professions . . . .”); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Three separate but 
related interests—the interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor, the interest of the parents, and 
the interest of the family unit—are relevant to our consideration of the constitutionality of the 48–
hour waiting period and the two-parent notification requirement.”); Akron, 462 U.S. at 439 (“In 
Bellotti . . . , a majority of the Court indicated that a State’s interest in protecting immature minors 
will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial.”); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1983) (“A State’s 
interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either 
parental or judicial.”); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (“As applied to immature and 
dependent minors, the statute plainly serves the important considerations of family integrity and 
protecting adolescents . . . . In addition, . . . the statute serves a significant state interest by 
providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a 
physician.”); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648 (“There is . . . an important state interest in encouraging a 
family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor’s abortion decision.”); Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (“One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the 
17
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In fact, contrary to what Hellerstedt I suggests, Casey evidences no real 
balancing of the benefits and burdens of the parental consent requirement 
at all. In fact, the Court’s opinion in Casey did little more than affirm that 
the judicial bypass provisions in the Pennsylvania statute fit within the 
parameters the Court had employed in prior opinions: “We have been 
over most of this ground before. Our cases establish, and we reaffirm 
today, that a state may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the 
consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial 
bypass procedure.”110
Because the Court in Hellerstedt I cited only Casey’s treatment of the 
Pennsylvania spousal notification and parental consent requirements and 
because, in analyzing those requirements, Casey does not consider the
state’s interest in protecting potential life, one might conclude that the 
balancing test that Hellerstedt I employed is inapplicable when a 
regulation is designed to serve the state’s interest in potential life.111 But
Casey’s analysis of the spousal notification and parental consent 
provisions makes no mention of the state’s interest in maternal health 
                                                                                                                     
family unit and of parental authority.”). While the district court in Hodgson determined that “the 
legislature was motivated by a desire to deter and dissuade minors from choosing to terminate 
their pregnancies,” Minnesota’s Attorney General disclaimed this purpose on appeal and the Court 
did not consider it, noting that “the state judges who have interpreted the statute in over 3,000 
decisions implementing its bypass procedures have found no legislative intent to disfavor the 
decision to terminate a pregnancy.” Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 428, 436. And although the Court in 
Matheson mentioned the state’s interest in protecting potential life, see Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413 
(“[S]tate action ‘encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances’ is ‘rationally 
related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.’”), the plurality in 
Casey did not cite Matheson anywhere in its opinion.
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899; see Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510–
19 (1990) (focusing on whether an Ohio judicial bypass provision satisfied constitutional 
requirements); Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417, 461 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (assessing 
whether a Minnesota judicial bypass provision was constitutional); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 497–
501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the constitutionality of a 
judicial bypass provision); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
439–40 (1983) (analyzing whether an Akron ordinance allowed for judicial bypass), overruled in 
part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (discussing 
the judicial bypass requirement). Similar to Casey’s treatment of the Pennsylvania spousal 
notification provision, the Court in Hodgson balanced the interests of a minor woman and one of 
her parents against the interests of the other parent in connection with a parental notification 
provision, see Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he combined for of the separate interest of one 
parent and the minor’s privacy interest must outweigh the separate interest of the second parent.”), 
but in analyzing the parental consent requirement in Casey, the Court does not cite the opinion of 
the Court in Hodgson.
111. See, e.g., Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (“According to DSHS, the Court should 
not balance the benefits and burdens of regulations expressing respect for the life of the unborn.”); 
Hopkins, F. Supp. 3d at 1055 (“Defendants contend that the balancing test . . . applies only when 
‘the state’s interest is in . . . a patient’s health or safety’ and that the lesser standard of rational 
basis review applies ‘when a state regulates to promote respect for unborn life.’”).
18
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either, and that interest was the focus in Hellerstedt I.112 Thus, deciding 
how broadly the balancing test recognized in Hellerstedt I applies is a
challenge.113
What type of means-ends analysis the balancing test contemplates 
also is elusive. Hellerstedt I unequivocally states that traditional, 
deferential rational basis review is not the proper standard: “[I]t is wrong 
to equate the judicial review [under the undue burden test] . . . with the 
less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is 
at issue.”114 Hellerstedt also purports to apply Casey, though, and the 
Court in Casey rejected strict scrutiny: 
[C]ases [in the period following Roe] decided that any 
regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive 
strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms 
to further a compelling state interest. Not all of the cases 
decided under that formulation can be reconciled with the 
holding in Roe itself that the State has legitimate interests in 
the health of the woman and in protecting the potential life 
within her.115
                                                                                                                     
112. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 ([O]ne is left to infer that the legislature sought to 
further a constitutionally acceptable objective (namely, protecting women’s health).”). Curiously, 
the Court in Hellerstedt I did not cite Casey’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements, the only provisions of the Pennsylvania statute that the Casey Court 
explicitly acknowledged as being designed to further the state’s interest in maternal health. See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (“Although [the recordkeeping and reporting requirements] do not relate 
to the State’s interest in informing the woman’s choice, they do relate to health.”).
113. Under the Court’s precedent, no judicial balancing test would be required if an abortion 
regulation does not impose an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. See Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315, 326 (1980) (“The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare 
regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses
to terminate her pregnancy, . . . . In making an independent appraisal of the competing interests 
involved here, the District Court went beyond the judicial function. Such decisions are entrusted 
under the Constitution to Congress, not the courts.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 479 (1977) 
(“The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles . . . in the pregnant woman’s path to an 
abortion . . . . Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those implicated by 
public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution . . . is the 
legislature.”).
114. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
115. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. The Court in City of Akron applied strict scrutiny to strike down 
an Akron ordinance regulating abortion, and in overruling City of Akron in part, the Court in Casey
referred to City of Akron as a case that errantly applied strict scrutiny. See id. at 882 (referring to 
City of Akron as an example of the inappropriate application of strict scrutiny and overruling the 
decision in City of Akron to strike down certain informed consent provisions); City of Akron, 462 
U.S. at 427 (“[R]estrictive state regulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other 
fundamental rights subject to searching judicial examination, must be supported by a compelling 
state interest.”), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Moreover, neither the Court’s analysis in Hellerstedt I nor in Casey or
Gonzales contains the marks of strict scrutiny—which requires a 
regulation to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest116—or of “intermediate” scrutiny—which requires that a 
regulation bear a substantial relationship to an important or legitimate 
government interest.117 Thus, to the extent that the balancing test 
Hellerstedt I employs is broadly applicable, it would seem to be less
demanding than even intermediate scrutiny, but more rigorous than 
deferential rational basis review. Unfortunately, the Court in Hellerstedt 
I did not give any meaningful guidance as to how to apply the balancing 
test in general or in any particular situation, leading Justice Clarence 
Thomas to suggest in his Hellerstedt I dissent that application of the 
undue burden standard “will surely mystify lower courts for years to 
come.”118
But a couple of things are relatively certain.  If Hellerstedt I means
that Casey’s undue burden standard requires balancing in all 
circumstances,119 the Court in Casey and Gonzales necessarily employed 
a balancing test when it sustained various regulations based on the
governmental interest in protecting potential life. And if that is so,
because Hellerstedt I does not address the interest in protecting potential 
                                                                                                                     
116. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining the 
requirements of strict scrutiny).
117. See id. at 441 (describing the requirements of intermediate scrutiny). Hellerstedt I refers 
to the state’s “legitimate” interest in protecting maternal health, Gonzales describes the state’s 
interest in protecting potential life as “legitimate” and “substantial” and its interest in maintaining 
medical standards as “legitimate,” and Casey indicates that the state’s interest in protecting 
potential life is “important,” “legitimate,” “substantial,” and “profound” and its interest in 
protecting maternal health is “important” and “legitimate.”  Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2309, 2311; 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145–46, 158 (2007); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 853, 870, 871, 
875–76, 878, 882, 883. But neither Hellerstedt I nor Gonzales refer to any compelling interest nor 
considers whether the regulations at issue are narrowly tailored or substantially related to the 
relevant government’s interests. And the Court in Casey specifically rejected applying strict 
scrutiny to abortion regulations and nowhere considered the substantiality of the relationship 
between the Pennsylvania statute and the state’s interests. See supra note 113 and accompanying 
text (indicating that Casey concluded that strict scrutiny was inconsistent with Roe). But see 
Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s undue-burden test looks 
far less like our post-Casey precedents and far more like the strict-scrutiny standard that Casey
rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales justified restrictions on abortion.”).
118. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. This Article assumes, but does not conclude, that Hellerstedt I balancing always is 
required under Casey’s undue burden standard. Given, however, that the Hellerstedt I Court 
concluded that each of the Texas regulations represented a substantial obstacles to abortion access, 
see supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Hellerstedt I), one might reasonably 
conclude that what the Court stated about balancing is mere dicta or only applies when a health-
based regulation poses a substantial obstacle.  
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life at all, Casey and Gonzales must control how to weigh the benefits 
and burdens of a measure that purports to serve that interest.
The Hellerstedt I Court’s rebuke of the Fifth Circuit for not 
considering the medical benefits of Texas’s admitting privileges and 
ambulatory surgery center requirements120 may tempt one to question 
whether a pre-viability abortion regulation always must yield medical 
benefits to satisfy the undue burden standard.  Again, though, Hellerstedt 
I did not overrule Casey,121 and the Court in Casey could not have been 
clearer that a regulation seeking to protect potential life by informing a 
woman’s choice need not offer any medical benefit: “[
even if those measures do not 
further a health interest ”122
Thus, when a state regulates abortion pre-viability in a manner 
designed to protect potential life—at least when it does so by adopting 
measures to inform a woman’s decision—the state’s regulation need not 
offer any medical benefits. On further inspection of both Casey and 
Gonzales, in fact, one can see that the benefit required to satisfy the undue 
burden test when an abortion regulation targets the interest in protecting 
potential life is minimal. Indeed, both decisions indicate that, for a 
regulation founded on that interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it 
need only be conceivable that the regulation would cause a woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion; the regulation’s constitutionality does 
not depend on how likely it is that the regulation will achieve that end in 
any particular case or any percentage of cases. 
In various places, the language the Court used in Casey and Gonzales
validates this conclusion. For instance, in upholding Pennsylvania’s 
informed consent provision, the Casey Court stated:    
Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an 
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not 
dispositive, to the decision. . . . We . . . see no reason why 
the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking 
an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the 
consequences to the fetus. . . . [W]e permit a State to further 
its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by 
enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is 
mature and informed . . . . In short, requiring that the woman 
                                                                                                                     
120. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2309
121. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
122. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 886 (“We . . . see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking 
an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when
those consequences have no direct relation to her health.”) (emphasis added).
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be informed of the availability of information relating to 
fetal development and the assistance available should she 
decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable 
measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might
cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.123
And with respect to the waiting period at issue in Casey, the Court 
added: “The idea that important decisions will be more informed and 
deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as 
unreasonable . . . In theory, at least, the waiting period is a reasonable 
measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting the life of the 
unborn . . . .”124 Simply put, these are not words that evidence a rigorous 
assessment of whether a woman actually would, or even would be likely 
to, decide against abortion ban based on the regulation.125
Gonzales is even clearer in this regard. In that case, the Court upheld 
the federal partial-birth abortion merely on its intuition regarding the 
effect abortion may have on an unspecified number of women: “While 
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to 
                                                                                                                     
123. Id. at 882–83 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 885.
125. In a number of places, the Court in Casey indicates that its decision to uphold aspects 
of the Pennsylvania statute were made in reliance on the record in the case. See id. at 884–85 
(“Since there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as 
provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman 
seeking an abortion, we conclude that it is not an undue burden.”); id. at 885 (“[T]he record 
evidence shows that in the vast majority of cases, a 24–hour delay does not create any appreciable 
health risk.”); id. at 887 (“[O]n the record before us, . . . we are not convinced that the 24–hour 
waiting period constitutes an undue burden.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 901 (“While at some point 
increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before 
us.”). Thus, one might contend that Casey leaves a window open for a plaintiff to present evidence 
that an abortion regulation founded on the state’s interest in potential life is or will be ineffective 
in causing women to choose childbirth over abortion. In each case in which the Court referred to 
the record, however, it was discussing the obstacles or burdens the relevant provisions imposed, 
not the potential benefits. See id. at 879–901. Moreover, one finds in Gonzales no evidence that 
it was relying on the record in deciding that the federal partial-birth abortion ban advanced the 
state’s interest in protecting potential life. Thus, the Casey Court’s references to the record should 
not undermine the conclusion that a regulation intended to advance the state’s interest in 
protecting prenatal life need only offer a conceivable benefit. In addition, even if the record were 
relevant in determining that a benefit exists, with campaigns like Silent No More in which women 
testify that they regret their abortions, it seems likely that the State would be able to offer evidence 
to rebut a plaintiff’s assertion that a regulation would not cause a woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion. See About Us, SILENT NO MORE AWARENESs, http://www.silentnomoreawareness.org/
about-us/ [https://perma.cc/4FAY-WTG6] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018); cf. Hellerstedt I, 136 S.
Ct. 2311–12 (“[W]hen directly asked at oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance 
in which the new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment, Texas 
admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such a case.”).  
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abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”126 Furthermore, the 
Court relied on inference to conclude that the partial-birth abortion ban 
furthers the state’s interest in protecting potential life:
It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the 
regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to 
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus 
reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions. . . . The 
State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue 
that better informs the political and legal systems, the 
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a 
whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to 
elect a late-term abortion.127
In addition to the language the Court used in both Casey and Gonzales,
the nature of the regulations that the Court upheld in the two cases 
confirms that to have a benefit sufficient to satisfy the undue burden test, 
it need only be conceivable that a regulation designed to promote 
childbirth could achieve that end. In Casey, for example, the Court 
sustained a requirement that a woman be told about available information 
regarding fetal development and resources available to a woman who 
chooses not to terminate her pregnancy,128 even though the applicable 
statute contained no requirement that a woman actually look at the 
information. And in Gonzales, the Court deemed the federal partial-birth 
abortion ban constitutional based on the information provided by the ban 
itself 129 without considering whether any particular woman would know 
of the ban then or in the future.
But perhaps the most compelling evidence of the low bar that applies 
to regulations designed to further the state’s interest in protecting 
potential life is found by comparing what the Hellerstedt I Court stated 
when it struck down Texas’s admitting privileges and ambulatory 
surgery center requirements to what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg said 
in objecting to the Gonzales Court’s decision to uphold the federal 
partial-birth abortion ban. In striking down the ambulatory surgery 
center requirement, the Court in Hellerstedt I reported: “record 
evidence . . . provides ample support for the . . . conclusion that ‘[m]any 
of the building standards mandated by the act and its implementing rules 
have such a tangential relationship to patient safety in the context of 
                                                                                                                     
126. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
128. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (determining that Pennsylvania’s informed consent 
requirements were constitutional).
129. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133, 160, 168 (reversing decisions of appeals courts that 
struck down the federal partial-birth abortion ban).
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abortion as to be nearly arbitrary.’”130 Likewise, with respect to the 
admitting privileges requirements, the Court stressed: “[W]hen directly 
asked at oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance in which 
the new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such 
a case.”131
What Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent in Gonzales is strikingly 
similar: “The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets 
only a method of performing abortion.”132 Yet, in Gonzales, a “reasonable 
inference” about the federal partial-birth abortion ban’s effect and the 
message it delivers offered “ample justification” for the ban—even in the 
absence of ‘reliable data’ to support the conclusion that “some women 
come to regret their choice to abort.”133 Thus, the measures at issue in 
Casey and Gonzales and the language the Court used in those cases 
(particularly when held up against the language found in Hellerstedt I)
attest to the fact that, if a regulation plausibly could cause a woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion, the regulation’s benefit is sufficient to 
satisfy Casey’s undue burden test.  
With such a low bar for finding a sufficient benefit, the critical 
constitutional question for an abortion regulation that serves the state’s 
interest in protecting potential life becomes the degree to which the 
regulation burdens women’s access to abortion. On this point, Casey is 
once again instructive. In describing its undue burden test, the Court in 
Casey explained: “What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the 
ultimate decision . . . . Regulations which do no more than create a 
structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound 
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”134 While the 
Court acknowledged that increased costs could impose an impermissible 
obstacle, those associated with Pennsylvania 24-hour waiting period and 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements did not.135 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                     
130. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 2311–12 (emphasis added).
132. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see id. at 160 (“It is objected that 
the standard D & E is in some respects as brutal, if not more, than the intact D & E, so that the 
legislation accomplishes little. What we have already said, however, shows ample justification 
for the regulation.”).
133. Id. at 159, 160.
134. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
135. See id. at 886 (“We do not doubt that, as the District Court held, the waiting period has 
the effect of ‘increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions,’ . . . but the District Court did not 
conclude that the increased costs and potential delays amount to substantial obstacles.”); id. at 
901 (“While at some point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no such 
showing on the record before us.”).
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Court determined that the waiting period did not “impose[] a real health 
risk” and that the effect on women living significant distances away from 
an abortion provider was not enough to invalidate the measure.136 In fact, 
the only aspect of the Pennsylvania statute that the Court determined 
unduly burdensome was the spousal notification requirement, which the 
Court explained would operate as a practical ban on abortion for some 
women.137
The collection of burdens that drove the Court in Hellerstedt I to strike 
down Texas’s admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center 
requirements arose from a consequence of perhaps greater magnitude—
large-scale abortion facility closures. According to the Court, the two 
requirements, when taken together, would cause the number of abortion 
facilities in the State to drop from approximately 40 to just 7 or 8.138 The 
closures resulting from the admitting privileges requirement, the Court 
decided, would impose substantial obstacles to abortion access because 
they “meant fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased 
crowding.”139 In addition, while acknowledging that increased driving 
distances alone may not present a significant obstacle to abortion, the 
Court stated that that burden was just one more to add to the mix.140 As 
to the additional closures attendant to the ambulatory surgery center 
requirement, the Court credited evidence and relied on “common sense” 
to conclude that the remaining facilities would be unable to meet 
demand141 and recited a litany of collateral consequences even if the 
remaining facilities could accommodate additional women seeking 
abortion services.142
Therefore, the consequences—an effective ban on abortion for a 
particular population of women and an approximately 80% reduction in 
                                                                                                                     
136. See id. at 885–86 (discussing the delay imposed on women who lived some distance 
away from an abortion provider). The Court in Gonzales likewise observed that an abortion 
regulation would be unconstitutional if it “subject[ed] [women] to significant health risks.” 
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161.
137. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (“[T]he significant number of women who fear for their 
safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely 
as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”).
138. See Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312, 2316 (2016) (noting that the district court had 
determined that the admitting privileges requirement caused the number of facilities to drop “from 
about 40 to about 20” and that the parties stipulated that the ambulatory surgery center 
requirement would cause the number of facilities to decrease to seven or eight).
139. Id. at 2313.
140. See id. (indicating that the increased traveling distances were “but one additional 
burden”).
141. Id. at 2317. See also id. at 2316–18 (finding the record sufficient to support the district 
court’s conclusion regarding the ability to meet demand). 
142. See id. at 2318 (indicating that a reduction in the number of available abortion facilities 
could deprive women of “individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support”).
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the number of abortion facilities available—that drove the Court in Casey
and Hellerstedt I to strike down abortion regulations at issue in those 
cases under the undue burden test were of significant scale. It is with this 
in mind that one must evaluate fetal remains disposition requirements.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODERN FETAL REMAINS 
DISPOSITION REQUIREMENTS
Despite the substantial freedom that Casey and Gonzales offer, two 
courts recently concluded that measures regulating the disposition of fetal 
remains do not meet, or are unlikely to meet, the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In PPINK, the Seventh Circuit struck down an 
Indiana statute providing that, if a woman having an abortion does not 
exercise her right to determine how the aborted fetus is to be disposed of, 
the facility in which the abortion is performed must ensure that the fetus 
is interred or cremated separately from other tissue extracted during 
surgery.143 And in Hellerstedt II, a Texas federal district court enjoined 
amended Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) regulations
and a subsequently-enacted Texas statute, both of which reduced the 
number of permissible means of disposing of tissue from abortions and 
miscarriages, eliminating the least expensive options and permitting only 
burial or cremation, regardless of the gestational age of the fetus.144
While both the Seventh Circuit and the Texas district court reached 
similar conclusions, they got there in different ways. In PPINK, the court 
did not even mention Casey’s undue burden test when evaluating 
Indiana’s fetal remains disposition statute, but instead determined that the 
statute could not survive the very deferential rational basis standard of 
                                                                                                                     
143. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 303–04 (describing the effects of the Indiana statute). While 
the Indiana statute does not allow a fetus to be cremated with other “surgical byproducts,” it does 
allow for fetuses to be cremated collectively. Id. at 304.
144. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 223–25 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (describing the 
amendments and their effect); see generally Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *1-2
(describing the Texas statute). The amended regulations state that the methods of disposition are 
limited to “interment, incineration followed by interment, or steam disinfection followed by 
interment,” and the definition of the term “interment” includes “‘the process of cremation 
followed by placement of the ashes in a niche, grave, or scattering of ashes.”’ Hellerstedt II, 231
F. Supp. 3d at 224. While the provisions of both the DSHS regulations and the Texas statute 
extend both to abortions and miscarriages, the regulations and statute only apply to fetal tissue 
expelled or delivered at a health care facility. Hellestedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 224 (“[T]he 
Amendments except ‘human tissue, including fetal tissue, that is expelled or removed . . . once 
the person is outside of a healthcare facility.’”); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *2 (“[A] 
Texas health care facility . . . must dispose of [embryonic and fetal tissue remains] passed or 
delivered at the facility.”); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.138.3(c)(5) (West 2017) (exempting “human 
tissue, including embryonic and fetal tissue, that is expelled or removed from the human body 
once the person is outside of a health care facility”). 
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review.145 The court in Hellerstedt II, in contrast, employed the undue 
burden test as explained in Hellerstedt I and found that the Texas 
regulations and statute likely fell short.146
A. PPINK
The parties in PPINK agreed that Indiana’s fetal remains disposition 
requirement did not implicate a fundamental right and therefore was 
subject to rational basis review, a standard that merely requires that a 
challenged law “be rationally related to legitimate government 
interests.”147 Under the rational basis standard, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof, and to be successful, she must prove that “there is [no] 
conceivable state of facts that supports” the law.148 According to the 
Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff had done so.149
In reaching its conclusion, the PPINK court determined that the state’s 
purported interest in “‘the humane and dignified disposal of fetal 
remains’”150 is not a legitimate one because a fetus is not a person for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.151 And the court rejected the 
State’s argument that its interest must be legitimate because other state 
and federal laws treat fetuses as “human beings.”152 Those other laws, the 
court asserted, are designed to foster respect for potential life and “no 
potential life [is] at stake” when Indiana’s fetal remains disposition 
statute applies.153 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the State’s 
argument that Gonzales recognized an interest in “fetal human dignity,” 
noting that Gonzales “‘involved a ‘ban on abortions that involve partial 
delivery of a living fetus.’”154
                                                                                                                     
145. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309–10 (concluding that the Indiana statute is not rationally 
related to any legitimate government interest).
146. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 227–32 (finding that the Texas regulations likely 
fail the undue burden test); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *5 (finding that the Texas 
statute likely fails the undue burden test).
147. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 307 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)).
148. Id. at 308 (quoting Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Community Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 
569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014)). While the plaintiffs asserted both substantive due process and equal 
protection claims, because the court determined that the law was invalid on due process grounds, 
it did not consider the equal protection claims. See id. at 307–08.
149. See id. at 309 (“[W]e cannot identify a rational relationship between the State’s 
interest . . . and the law as written . . . . Accordingly, the fetal disposition provisions violated 
substantive due process.”).
150. Id. at 308.
151. See id. (“Simply put, the law does not recognize that an aborted fetus is a person. . . . As 
such, the State’s interest in requiring abortion providers to dispose of aborted fetuses in the same
manner as human remains is not legitimate.”).
152. See id. at 308–10.
153. Id. at 308.
154. Id.
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The court also distinguished the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Planned 
Parenthood of Minnesota, emphasizing that that court’s recognition of a 
legitimate interest in “protecting public sensibilities” was mere dicta 
because Planned Parenthood had conceded the interest’s legitimacy. 155
In addition, the Seventh Circuit insisted, the interest recognized in the 
Eighth Circuit case was “meaningfully different” from the interest 
Indiana cited in PPINK because the stated purpose of Minnesota’s fetal 
remains disposition law was protection of “public health and welfare,” 
not protection of the fetus.156
Finally, the court declared that even if Indiana had a legitimate interest 
“in the humane and dignified disposal of aborted fetuses,” an interest that 
would “require[] recognizing that the fetus is legally equivalent to a 
human,” the state’s disposition requirement was not rationally related to 
that interest because it did not treat fetal remains in the same manner as 
human remains.157 According to the court, the disposition requirement 
allows a woman to determine how to dispose of her aborted fetus, and 
Indiana law does not otherwise allow a person to dispose of human 
remains in whatever way she wishes.158 Moreover, the court pointed out, 
the disposition statute broadly permits simultaneous cremation of the 
remains of different fetuses, a practice that is restricted when disposing 
of other human remains.159
B. Hellerstedt II
Unlike the court in PPINK, whose rigorous application of the rational 
basis standard led to the demise of Indiana’s fetal remains disposition 
law, the Texas district court in Hellerstedt II looked to Casey’s undue 
burden standard—and the Hellerstedt I Court’s interpretation of it—to
enjoin the amendments to the DSHS regulations and Texas statute 
governing the disposition of fetal remains.160 And consistent with 
                                                                                                                     
155. Id. at 309. See also notes 50–62 and accompanying text (discussing Planned 
Parenthood of Minnesota).
156. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309. See also notes 50–62 and accompanying text (discussing 
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota).
157. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309.
158. See id. (describing laws governing burial and cremation).
159. See id. (discussing when simultaneous cremation is permitted). 
160. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (deciding that the 
plaintiffs were likely to succeed in claiming that the Texas amendments violate the undue burden 
test); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317 at *5 (“Plaintiff [sic] . . . establish a substantial 
likelihood of success on their claim Chapter 697 imposes an undue burden on . . . [a woman’s] 
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”). Although DSHS claimed that the Texas 
statute superseded the earlier amended regulations, the court declined to consider the earlier 
regulations moot because DSHS had not provided evidence that the statute replaced the 
regulations and because, if not invalid themselves, the regulations would apply in the event the 
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Hellerstedt I, the Hellerstedt II court claimed that to survive the undue 
burden test, an abortion regulation must serve a legitimate state interest 
and the burdens the regulation imposes on a woman’s ability to choose 
abortion must not outweigh the regulation’s benefits.161
The DSHS regulations and the Texas statute, the court found, failed 
at every turn. First, while acknowledging that Casey recognizes that the 
state has an interest in protecting potential life, the court determined that 
the amendments to the DSHS regulations did not further that interest 
because the DSHS regulations apply after an abortion occurs, when no 
potential life is left to protect.162 Similarly, in considering the Texas 
legislation, the district court stated that “there is no precedent showing 
[that there is a legitimate state interest in] expressing respect for the 
unborn by restricting [embryonic and fetal tissue remains] disposal after 
the potential for life no longer exists.”163 Moreover, the court in 
Hellerstedt II observed that both the amendments to the DSHS 
regulations and the later-adopted Texas law suggest that human life 
begins at conception and thereby might interfere with a woman’s 
constitutionally-protected right to her own personal beliefs.164
Second, the court decided that the benefits associated with the DSHS 
regulations and the Texas statute were insignificant. With respect to the 
statute, the court stated that “the only identified benefit is the expression 
of the State’s respect for the unborn.”165 And the court rejected the 
assertion that the amendments to the DSHS regulations would “confer[] 
dignity on the unborn,” questioning how DSHS’s recommendation that 
                                                                                                                     
statute is invalid. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317 at *4 (discussing the mootness of the 
DSHS regulations). 
161. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (indicating that the Supreme Court in 
Hellerstedt I, “confirmed that a state must act on a legitimate interest” and that a court must weigh 
the benefits and burdens of the law in determining whether it violates a woman’s constitutional 
rights); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, *5–6 (describing the undue burden test as 
explained in Hellerstedt I).  
162. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
163. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
164. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (noting Casey’s reference to a person’s right 
to “define [her] own concept of the mystery of human life.”); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 
30317, at *7 (noting the same Casey reference to a person’s right to define the concept of human 
life). The court also pointed out that, based on the timing of publication of the amendments in 
relation to the decision in Hellerstedt I and given the fact that DSHS only considered the financial 
impact with respect to abortion (and not the impact in other circumstances under which disposal 
of fetal tissue would be required), it could conclude that the regulations were unconstitutional 
because they were designed to restrict access to abortion. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229–
30. Because the statutory disposition requirements at one point had been part of a larger bill that 
prohibit certain abortions, the court similarly speculated that the underlying purpose of the statute 
might be to restrict abortion. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6. 
165. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7.
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fetal remains from separate procedures be placed in a single container and 
frozen until disposal better protected dignity than the current 
regulations.166 In addition, the court indicated that the fact that the DSHS 
regulations did not apply to fetal remains expelled or removed outside a 
medical facility weakened the benefit DSHS suggested.167
Finally, the Hellerstedt II court recited a series of burdens that the 
amended regulations and the Texas statute might impose on a woman’s 
ability to have an abortion. For example, the court stated that the 
regulations and law would cause health care providers to incur additional 
costs and that DSHS had underestimated the costs associated with the 
regulations by failing to take into account Texas’s size and population, as 
well as “transportation costs, administrative costs, [and] . . . vendor 
availability.”168 The court also suggested that a lack of vendor availability 
might lead to facility closures.169 In addition, according to the court, the 
amended regulations and the Texas statute would present logistical 
challenges for medical facilities with respect to “sorting procedure, 
storage, transportation, and ultimate disposal and might cause women to 
experience “grief and shame,” thereby deterring them from seeking 
appropriate medical care.170 Although the court acknowledged that the 
Texas legislature had attempted to ameliorate some of the potential 
problems associated with the DSHS regulations—by mandating a 
registry accessible to physicians and health care facilities that identifies 
parties willing to provide free or low-cost burial or financial assistance to 
defray the costs of cremation or burial, and by directing the development 
of a grant program to assist with the costs arising from disposition of fetal 
                                                                                                                     
166. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230.
167. Id. at 230.
168. Id. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6 (citing increased costs as a burden).
169. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (noting testimony that one “center was nearly 
forced to close after two successive medical waste disposal vendors dropped the healthcare 
facility” and concluding that “there may be insufficient vendors to handle the disposal of fetal 
tissue in compliance with the Amendments, which would be a major, if not fatal, blow to 
healthcare providers performing abortions.”). DSHS had identified two possible vendors who 
might provide for disposal—a funeral home and the Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops. See 
Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231. The court discounted both, indicating that neither appeared 
to have the appropriate permits, that the funeral home was inexperienced and would impose a 
specific requirement that could increase costs, and that use of the Texas Catholic Conference of 
Bishops might “distress[] patients who have different religious views or do not see fetal tissue as 
a person.” Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231.
170. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7 
(indicating that it was “unclear” as to whether the Texas statute resolved the logistical difficulties 
associated with the DSHS regulations and that evidence indicated that the fetal remains 
disposition requirements might result in “grief and shame”).
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remains as required by law—171 the Hellerstedt II court assigned little 
weight to those measures because it could identify no evidence that they 
would have an appreciable impact when the Texas statute was set to 
become effective.172
Having considered both the potential benefits and burdens of the 
DSHS amendments, the court in Hellerstedt II decided that the increased 
costs, the possible “stigma” on women, and the “potentially devastating 
logistical challenges for abortion providers” were likely to “substantially 
outweigh” the questionable benefit of protecting the dignity of the 
unborn.173 Likewise, the court determined that the burdens it had 
identified with respect to the Texas statute exceeded the sole identified 
benefit of expressing respect for life.174 Thus, within the space of about a 
year, the court had granted preliminary injunctions against both the 
DSHS amendments and the later-adopted Texas legislation.175
C. Examining PPINK and Hellerstedt II
Although the Seventh Circuit in PPINK and the Texas district court in 
Hellerstedt II took different paths, they have in common some serious 
flaws that undermine their conclusions. Contrary to what the two courts 
found, the Indiana statute at issue in PPINK and the DSHS amendments 
and Texas statute at issue in Hellerstedt II all serve the same legitimate, 
important, substantial, and profound governmental interest—the interest 
in protecting potential life.176 The three measures therefore easily satisfy 
the rational basis standard of review.
In addition, the fetal remains disposition requirements in Indiana and 
Texas offer benefits sufficient to meet the extremely low standard that 
applies under Casey’s undue burden test for abortion regulations 
designed to advance the state’s interest in protecting potential life. Thus, 
if Casey’s undue burden standard applies as the Texas district court 
decided in Hellerstedt II, the real question for the requirements is whether 
they impose burdens of the magnitude that led the Court to strike down 
the Pennsylvania spousal notification requirement in Casey and the Texas 
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements in 
Hellerstedt I. When viewed in light of the history of fetal remains 
                                                                                                                     
171. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 697.005–.006 (West 2017) (requiring DSHS 
to establish a registry to help reduce costs associated with the disposition requirements and 
directing DSHS to establish a grant program).
172. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7 (giving little credit to the registry and 
grant program).
173. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 232.
174. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7 (concluding that the burdens associated 
with the law surpassed the benefit).
175. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 232–33; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *8.
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (reciting the various ways in which the Court 
has described the interest in protecting potential life).
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disposition requirements, this seems very unlikely. Thus, the Indiana 
statute, the DSHS amendments, and the Texas legislation are apt to 
survive a substantive due process challenge irrespective of whether 
rational basis review or the undue burden test represents the proper 
standard. And when one examines the PPINK and Hellerstedt II opinions 
closely, it is easy to see the mistakes that took the Seventh Circuit and the 
Texas district court in the opposite direction. 
1. The State’s Interest in Protecting Potential Life
Regardless of whether rational basis review or Casey’s undue burden 
test is the appropriate measure to use in assessing the constitutionality of 
a fetal remains disposition requirement, a court must consider whether 
the government has a legitimate interest that will sustain the requirement. 
Neither the Seventh Circuit in PPINK nor the Texas district court in 
Hellerstedt II found one.177 The court in PPINK found inapplicable the 
asserted governmental interests in “‘the humane and dignified disposal of 
fetal remains,’” “promoting respect for potential life,” upholding “fetal 
human dignity,” and “‘protecting public sensibilities.”178 Similarly, when 
considering the DSHS amendments, the court in Hellerstedt II rejected 
interests in “‘afford[ing] the level of protection and dignity to the unborn 
children as state law afford [sic] to adults and children,’” “respecting [the] 
‘life and dignity of the unborn,’” and protecting potential life.179 Finally, 
with respect to the Texas fetal remains disposition statute, the Hellerstedt
II court claimed that “there is no precedent showing expressing respect 
for the unborn by restricting [embryonic and fetal tissue remains] after 
the potential for life no longer exists is a valid state interest.”180
Whatever one might conclude about the other interests the two courts 
considered, their dismissal of Indiana’s and Texas’s interest in protecting 
potential life reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of 
that interest and what a state might do to advance it. Roe, Casey, and 
Gonzales are clear that the state has a profound, important, substantial, 
and legitimate interest in protecting potential life,181 and the courts in 
PPINK and Hellerstedt II incorrectly attempted to confine that interest by 
                                                                                                                     
177. See PPINK, 888 F.3d 300, 309 (7th Cir. 2018); Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230.
178. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308–09.
179. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
180. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
181. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 126 (2007) (“A central premise of Casey’s joint 
opinion [is] that the government has a legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting 
fetal life . . . .”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“The very 
notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all 
regulations must be deemed unwarranted.”); id. at 878 (noting “the State’s profound interest in 
potential life”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (observing that the state has an “important 
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life”).
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concluding that it could not justify a regulation that applies most directly 
to a fetus that no longer has the potential for life.182 Either a state has a 
legitimate interest in some end or it does not, and the Roe Court did not 
limit the interest in protecting potential life to particular points in time; 
instead, the Court described the relative strength of the interest as a 
pregnancy progresses: “[The interest] grows in substantiality as the 
woman approaches term . . . .”183 And while Casey Gonzales
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County
The justification for the statute offered by the State . . . is 
that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage 
pregnancies. . . . And although our cases establish that the 
State’s asserted reason for the enactment of a statute may be 
rejected, if it ‘could not have been a goal of the legislation,’
this is not such a case. . . . We are satisfied not only that the 
prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one of the 
“purposes” of the statute, but also that the State has a strong 
interest in preventing such pregnancy. . . . Of particular 
concern to the State is that approximately half of all teenage 
pregnancies end in abortion.185
Danforth Casey 
                                                                                                                     
182. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (“The fetal disposition provisions differ because there is no 
potential life at stake.”); Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“The Amendments 
regulate . . . activities that occur when there is no potential life to protect.”); Hellerstedt II (order),
2018 BL 30317, at *6 (“Gonzalez merely confirmed ‘the government may use its voice and its 
regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.’” (emphasis in 
original)).
183. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
184. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
185. Id. at 470–71.
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The Act expresses respect for the dignity of human 
life. . . . It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of 
the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to 
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus 
                                                                                                                     
186. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 900–01 (“Although [the recordkeeping and reporting provisions] 
do not relate to the State’s interest in informing the woman’s choice, they do relate to health. The 
collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and 
so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more 
difficult.”); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81 (“Recordkeeping of this kind, if not abused or overdone, can 
be useful to the State’s interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and may be a resource 
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment.”).
187. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (evaluating the benefits of Texas’s fetal 
remains disposition requirements).
188. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (upholding a Pennsylvania statute that requires “the 
physician [who is to perform an abortion] or a qualified nonphysician [to] inform the woman of 
the availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus”).
189. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
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reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions. . . . The 
State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue 
that better informs the political and legal systems, the 
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a 
whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to 
elect a late-term abortion.190
Planned 
Parenthood Association of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Insofar as the ordinance may 
serve as an indirect reminder that there is a school of thought that equates 
such termination of a pregnancy with termination of a life, the ordinance 
may conceivably make for slightly more thoughtful decisions on whether 
to terminate or not to terminate.”192 Thus, a fetal remains disposition 
requirement serves the state’s interest in protecting potential life by 
attempting to ensure that women make informed decisions about whether 
to choose abortion.
Moreover, the Court in Casey Gonzales
Casey
Gonzales
                                                                                                                     
190. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 160.
191. 822 F.2d 1390 (1987).
192. Id. at 1405 (Nelson, J., dissenting). In Planned Parenthood Association of Cincinnati,
the Sixth Circuit upheld an injunction against a fetal remains disposition requirement on the 
grounds of vagueness and did consider whether the requirement impermissibly infringed on a 
woman’s ability to choose abortion. See id. at 1399 (granting a preliminary injunction against a 
fetal remains requirement based on a claim that the requirement was unconstitutionally vague).
193. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (“Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an 
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.”); 
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60 (indicating that the state has an interest in making sure that a woman 
makes informed decisions and that knowing how her fetus was aborted may intensify grief if she 
comes to regret her abortion).
194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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Gonzales
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some 
doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the 
means that will be used [to dispose of a woman’s aborted 
fetus]. . . . It is, however, precisely this lack of information 
concerning the way in which the fetus will be [disposed of]
that is of legitimate concern to the State. The State has an 
interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is 
self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to 
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow 
more profound when she learns, only after the event, what 
she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to [dispose 
of the body] of her unborn child, a child assuming the human 
form [by grinding and discharging the child’s body to a 
sewer system].196
In addition to inappropriately confining the governmental interest in 
protecting potential life and ignoring the potential role fetal remains 
disposition requirements may play in informing a woman’s decision 
about abortion, the Seventh Circuit in PPINK and the Texas district court 
in Hellerstedt II failed to appreciate that the Supreme Court’s 
determination that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment197 in no way prevents a state from treating fetal remains as 
it would the remains of a person who had been born.198 Importantly, the 
                                                                                                                     
195. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
196. Id. at 160. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (noting that “grinding and 
discharging to a sanitary sewer system” historically had been a permitted means for disposing of 
an aborted or miscarried fetus).
197. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
does not include the unborn.”). 
198. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (“[T]he Supreme Court has concluded that ‘the word 
‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.’ . . . As such, the 
State’s interest in requiring abortion providers to dispose of aborted fetuses in the same manner 
as human remains is not legitimate.”); Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (“[B]y seeking to 
respect life and the dignity of the unborn regardless of gestational age, DSHS appears to be 
inferentially establishing the beginning of human life as conception . . . .”).
Fetal remains disposition requirements are not the only way in which states treat prenatal life 
in a manner consistent with how they treat a person who has been born. More than two-thirds of 
the states, including Indiana and Texas, have homicide laws that apply to fetuses. See NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,  http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/fetal-homicide-state-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/2GGQ-B4DT] (discussing fetal homicide laws and listing the states 
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Court in Roe stated: “Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in 
this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins 
at conception or at some other point prior to live birth.”199 And less than 
five years later, the Court in Maher v. Roe stressed: “[T]he right [to an 
abortion] protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with 
her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no 
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring 
childbirth over abortion . . . .”200
Furthermore, if Roe and Maher aren’t clear enough, the Court’s 
decision in Webster leaves no doubt that regardless of who is considered 
a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may take a 
position on when life begins. The Webster Court considered a challenge 
to a Missouri law whose preamble stated plainly that “[t]he life of each 
human being begins at conception.”201 And in determining that the 
preamble did present a constitutional issue, the Court observed:
[T]he meaning of the Akron dictum . . . was only that a 
State could not “justify” an abortion regulation otherwise 
invalid under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it embodied 
the State’s view about when life begins. . . . The Court has 
emphasized that Roe v. Wade “implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring 
childbirth over abortion.” The preamble can be read simply 
to express that sort of value judgment.202
According to the Court, the state’s view of when life begins only takes 
on constitutional significance when it actually affects a woman’s ability 
                                                                                                                     
that have them). Notwithstanding the Court’s recognition in Roe that a fetus or embryo is not a 
person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit has explained that the 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence does not preclude states from adopting these laws. See
Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 1998) (“States remain free to punish feticide 
so long as they don’t try to punish a woman who exercises her constitutional right to abort her 
fetus, the physician who performs the abortion, or the hospital or other facility, even if public, in 
which the abortion is performed.”). See also DeGasperin v. Ballard, No. 16-0133, 2017 WL 
663577, at *16 (“This Court finds and concludes that neither Roe v. Wade nor its progeny prevent 
a state legislature from making an unborn fetus or embryo the victim of any of the above crimes.”); 
State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) (“Roe v. Wade protects the woman’s right of 
choice; it does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy 
the fetus.”).
199. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
200. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (“But the 
constitutional freedom recognized in Wade and its progeny, the Maher Court explained, did not 
prevent Connecticut from making ‘a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion’ . . . .”).
201. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 504 (1989).
202. Id. at 506.
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to choose to terminate her pregnancy.203 The very fact that a regulation 
evidences a particular view on personhood—one that is contrary to what 
the Court has determined for purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—is 
inapposite.
2. Rational Basis Review
As the 
Seventh Circuit explained, when a measure is subject to rational basis 
review, the legislature is entitled to broad deference and the plaintiff’s 
burden is a high one: “So long as there is any conceivable state of facts 
that supports the policy, it passes muster under the due process clause; 
put another way, only if the policy is patently arbitrary would it fail.”204
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stressed that “rational-basis 
review . . . ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices[,]’” and “a legislature . . . need not ‘actually 
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting [the choices it 
makes].’”205
With these principles in mind, applying the rational basis standard to 
fetal remains disposition requirements like those in Indiana and Texas is 
very straightforward. First, as discussed above, at least since Roe, the 
Court has recognized that a state has an “important and legitimate” 
interest in protecting potential life.206 Second, the Court in both Casey 
and Gonzales pointed out that a state may advance this interest by 
“express[ing] profound respect for the life of the unborn.”207 Third, the 
Court in Gonzales emphasized that a government can express its respect 
through the mere adoption of an abortion regulation: “[T]he government 
may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect 
for the life within [a] woman.” . . . 
the knowledge it conveys
                                                                                                                     
203. See id. at 506 (“It will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the 
preamble should it be applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way.”).
204. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308 (quoting Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 
743 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014)).
205. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993).
206. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
207. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (emphasizing Casey’s 
recognition that “[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the 
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn 
are permitted . . . .”).
208. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 160 (emphasis added).
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might cause a pregnant woman to see the fetus as a person, so might
requiring a health care facility to dispose of an aborted or miscarried fetus 
in a manner similar to that in which a born human body is disposed.
Indeed, even the Seventh Circuit testified as to the unmistakable message 
a fetal remains disposition requirement sends: 
under rational basis review, this possibility is sufficient.210 As the Court 
emphasized in H.L. v. Matheson, “State action ‘encouraging childbirth 
except in the most urgent circumstances’ is ‘rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.’”211
Satisfaction of the rational basis standard is just that simple, and the 
Seventh Circuit in PPINK was wrong to complicate it by dismissing 
Indiana’s interest in protecting potential life and going through a means-
ends test that more closely resembles intermediate or strict scrutiny.212
3. Casey’s Undue Burden Standard
While the Supreme Court has used rational basis review for some 
regulations touching on abortion—such as a Connecticut regulation that 
denied Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions and the federal 
Hyde Amendment, which bars the use of Medicaid funds for certain 
abortions—a key point that led the Court to apply the deferential standard 
in those cases was that the regulations did not impose any barriers to 
abortion.213 In contrast, the plaintiffs in Hellerstedt II insisted that the 
                                                                                                                     
209. PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309. See also Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 222 (W.D. Tex. 
2017) (“The Amendments inferentially establish the beginning of life . . . .”); Margaret S. v. 
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222 (E.D. La. 1980) (“Such a question equates the abortion process 
with the taking of a human life . . . .”); Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 669 (E.D. La. 
1984) (“Underlying this requirement, plaintiffs argue, is the belief that the aborted fetus is a 
‘baby,’ and therefore entitled to the same kind of ritual upon death as are other human beings.”).
210. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough 
that there is [problem requiring] correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure [is] a rational way to correct it.” (emphasis added)); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“[T] he Constitution presumes that even 
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.”).
211. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
325 (1980)).
212. See PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308–09 (analyzing whether the statute required fetal remains 
to be treated in the same manner that human remains must be treated under other Indiana law). 
213. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 478 (1977) (indicating that the regulation at issue 
“place[d] no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion” and 
that the issue was “whether [the] regulation [could] be sustained under the less demanding test of 
rationality”); McRae, 448 U.S. at 315, 324 (stating that “[t]he Hyde Amendment, like the 
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Texas fetal remains disposition requirements place obstacles in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion by increasing the cost of the procedure, 
creating logistical challenges for abortion providers, and potentially 
causing women to experience “grief and shame.”214 Thus, it was not 
unreasonable for the Hellerstedt II court to assess Texas’s fetal remains 
disposition requirements under Casey’s undue burden test. Even under 
this more rigorous test, however, fetal remains disposition requirements 
like those adopted in Indiana and Texas should survive constitutional 
challenge. 
The Hellerstedt I Court stated that the undue burden standard requires 
a court to balance the benefits and burdens of an abortion regulation, but 
as discussed in Part II.B, Casey and Gonzales teach that, for a regulation 
designed to protect potential life to satisfy the undue burden test, it need 
only be plausible that the regulation would cause a woman to choose 
childbirth over abortion.215 If a partial-birth abortion ban and a 
requirement 
does a regulation mandating disposition of the body 
of a dead fetus in the same manner that is required for the disposition of 
a body that has been born. At least “in theory,”216 “a necessary effect” of 
requiring disposal of fetal remains as one would of a body of a person 
who was born will be to cause “some women” to see that the two share
                                                                                                                     
Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of 
a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy” and then asking “whether the Hyde 
Amendment is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective”).
214. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317 *1, *7
(W.D. Tex. 2018). See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230–32 (discussing burdens associated 
with the DSHS regulations); Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6–7 (discussing burdens 
associated with the Texas statute). The plaintiffs in PPINK likely would have had difficulty 
asserting that the challenged statute created the potential for “grief and shame” because existing 
Indiana law required that a woman be told of her right to dispose of the fetus and that she inform 
the abortion facility in writing of her decision regarding disposition. See IND. CODE § 16-34-2-
1.1(a)(2)(H) & (I) (2018) (requiring notification of woman’s right to direct disposition); IND.
CODE § 16-34-3-2(b) (requiring woman to inform abortion facility in writing of her decision 
regarding disposition). And while one of the plaintiffs in PPINK suggested at the district court 
level that Indiana’s statute would increase the costs of abortion providers, see PPINK, 194 F.
Supp. 3d 818, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (“PPINK produced evidence that compliance with the new 
fetal tissue disposition provisions will result in a meaningful increase in its expenses.”), the 
Seventh Circuit did not address this point, perhaps because it is irrelevant under rational basis 
review.
215. See supra Part II.B (discussing the minimal benefit required for regulations designed to 
advance the State’s interest in protecting potential life).
216. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992).
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the same dignity, thereby “encourag[ing] [those women] to carry the 
infant to full term.”217 That is enough for the undue burden test.
In finding that the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center 
requirements at issue in Hellerstedt I yielded no appreciable benefit from 
the standpoint of maternal health, the Court asserted that abortion was 
already an “extremely safe” procedure in Texas, and “[t]hus, there was 
no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.”218
With significant numbers of abortions being performed across the United 
                                                                                                                     
217. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007).
218. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311 (2016). In discussing the absence of a health-related 
benefit attributable to Texas’s ambulatory surgery center requirement, the Court pointed out that 
Texas did not require facilities in which liposuction and colonoscopies are performed to meet the 
standards for ambulatory surgery centers, notwithstanding the evidence that those procedures are 
safer than abortion. See id. at 2315 (discussing other procedures). Given the relative safety of the 
other procedures, the Court concluded that the differential treatment of abortion facilities could 
not be justified based on the state’s interest in protecting maternal health. See id. at 2315 (“These 
facts indicate that the surgical-center provision imposes ‘a requirement that simply is not based 
on differences’ between abortion and other surgical procedures ‘that are reasonably related to’ 
preserving women’s health, the asserted ‘purpos[e] of the Act . . . .’”). When the state is seeking 
to advance its interest in protecting potential life, however, treating the abortion procedure 
differently from other medical procedures is permissible given the presence of the fetus. See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for 
others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; … and, depending on 
one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1976) (permitting an informed consent requirement for abortion 
even though similar requirements do not apply to most other surgeries and indicating that “[t]he 
decision to abort … is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative 
that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences”); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 159 (1973) (“She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions 
of the developing young in the human uterus. The situation therefore is inherently different from 
marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or 
education . . . .” (citation omitted)). Therefore, imposing requirements for the disposition of 
fetuses that are different from those applicable to other tissue does not, without more, create a 
constitutional problem. Moreover, imposing the same or similar requirements for the disposition 
of the remains of miscarried fetuses, as the DSHS amendments, the new Texas statute, and a 
separate Indiana law do, delivers a consistent message regarding the value of pre-natal life. See 
Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (indicating that Texas’s regulations regarding the disposition 
of fetal remains applied to miscarried fetuses); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 697.004(a) 
(West 2017) (applying broadly to embryonic and fetal tissue remains); IND. CODE § 16-21-11-6(b) 
(2018) (requiring cremation or interment of a miscarried fetus). Notably, since 2014, Indiana has 
required health care facilities to notify the parents of a miscarried fetus of their right to determine 
the disposition of the fetus. IND. CODE § 16-21-11-5 (2017).
The Texas district court in Hellerstedt II suggested that not imposing the DSHS fetal remains 
disposition requirements when a miscarried or aborted fetus is delivered at home “reduces the 
strength of the asserted benefit” of “conferring dignity on the unborn.” Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp.
3d at 230. Whether the exception undermines that benefit or not, the Hellerstedt II court failed to 
recognize that “privacy concerns implicit in activity in one’s home” offer a legitimate basis for 
the differential treatment. Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d 479, 488 (8th Cir. 1990).
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States (including in Texas and in Indiana),219 however, the same cannot 
be said with respect to the state’s interest in protecting potential life. So 
long as there is abortion, the state will have a reason to express its view 
regarding pre-natal life, and laws like fetal remains disposition 
requirements that express that view will offer a benefit sufficient to 
satisfy Casey’s undue burden test.
As a result, whether a fetal remains disposition requirement passes the 
undue burden test depends on the requirement’s burdens—specifically, 
on whether the requirement imposes “a substantial obstacle in the path of 
women seeking an abortion.”220 Under existing precedent, though—
unless the logistical challenges the Hellerstedt II court noted lead to a 
significant number of clinic closures—none of the potential burdens the 
plaintiffs in Hellerstedt II highlighted are likely to be fatal. 
The potential for “grief and shame”221 that the Hellerstedt II court 
cites as a possible burden seems unlikely to be invalidating when 
considered in light of Casey and Gonzales. The Court’s concern in those 
cases was the potential effect on a woman’s psychological health if the 
applicable regulations were not in place.222 In fact, in overruling its earlier 
decision in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,223 the Casey Court apparently abandoned its fear that 
state-mandated information regarding fetal development might “serve 
only to confuse and punish [a woman] and to heighten her anxiety.”224
Rather than focusing on the potentially negative psychological effects of 
providing information to a woman seeking an abortion, the Court has 
feared what might occur if the state were not permitted to do so—that a 
woman might suffer severe anguish if she has an abortion and later 
                                                                                                                     
219. See Rachel Jones and Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability In the 
United States, 2014, 49 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 17, 21 (2017),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1363/psrh.12015/full [https://perma.cc/3SCZ-
XKKC] (indicating that more than 900,000 abortions were performed in the United States in 2014, 
including over 55,000 in Texas and over 8,000 in Indiana).
220. Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2316. See also Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. at 2312 (“[T]he record 
evidence indicates that the admitting privileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman’s choice.’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877)); Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94 (“The 
spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of women from 
obtaining an abortion. . . . [F]or many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle.”).
221. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *7.
222. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (“In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the 
full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk 
that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological 
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”).
223. 476 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1986).
224. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (overruling Thornburgh in part, because it was “inconsistent
with Roe’s acknowledgement of an important interest in potential life”).
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concludes that she was not fully informed.225 As the Court stated in 
Gonzales:
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence 
some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the 
means that will be used [to perform an abortion], . . . . From 
one standpoint this ought not to be surprising. Any number 
of patients facing imminent surgical procedures would 
prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding 
invasive medical procedures become the more intense. . . . It 
is, however, precisely this lack of information . . . that is of 
legitimate concern to the State.226
In addition, the mere fact that an abortion regulation has an adverse 
effect on abortion providers will not render it unconstitutional. The Court 
in Whalen v. Roe explained this point:
The constitutional right vindicated in Doe was the right 
of a pregnant woman to decide whether or not to bear a child 
without unwarranted state interference. The statutory 
restrictions on the abortion procedures were invalid because 
they encumbered the woman’s exercise of that 
constitutionally protected right by placing obstacles in the 
path of the doctor upon whom she was entitled to rely for 
advice in connection with her decision. If those obstacles had 
not impacted upon the woman’s freedom to make a 
constitutionally protected decision, if they had merely made 
the physician’s work more laborious or less independent 
without any impact on the patient, they would not have 
violated the Constitution.227
Therefore, increased costs and logistical difficulties that abortion 
providers may suffer as a result of a fetal remains disposition requirement 
are relevant under Casey’s undue burden test only to the extent that they 
adversely affect a woman’s access to abortion. 
Indeed, Casey emphasizes that “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right 
to make the ultimate decision.”228 In this regard, the Court’s principal 
concern in Hellerstedt I was the fact that Texas’s admitting privileges and 
                                                                                                                     
225. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (“[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort . . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (“In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences 
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may 
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her 
decision was not fully informed.”).
226. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
227. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977).
228. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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ambulatory surgery center requirement would result in a dramatic 
decrease in the number of abortion facilities.229 And when invalidating 
Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement, the Court in Casey
concluded that it would represent a practical ban on abortion in some 
cases, thereby preventing some women from making the decision to have 
an abortion.230 On the other hand, the Casey Court stressed that 
“numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of 
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care” and 
“[t]he fact that a law . . . has the incidental effect of making it more 
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to 
invalidate it.”231
Particularly in light of the experience with Minnesota’s 30-year-old 
fetal remains disposition requirement, it seems much more likely that 
requirements such as those in Indiana and Texas will have a relatively 
minor and incidental effect on a woman’s ability to choose abortion, 
rather than result in the severe consequences that led the Court to strike 
down abortion regulations in Casey and Hellerstedt I. The district court 
in Hellerstedt II rejected the state’s estimate of the cost associated with 
the DSHS amendments and the state’s assumption that “the ash from all 
abortions across the State of Texas could be buried at one time for only 
$300 per year”232 and, with respect to the Texas fetal remains disposition 
statute, cited evidence that the cost per hospital could “range between 
$228,400–$655,200.”233 But the notes accompanying the implementing 
regulations for the Texas statute cite testimony from an economist for the 
Hellerstedt II plaintiffs that “the cost would range between $0.52 and 
$1.56 per patient.”234 Moreover, the statute mandates the creation of a 
registry that identifies parties that will provide free or low-cost burial or 
will provide financial assistance to defray the costs of cremation or burial 
and a grant program to assist with the costs arising from disposition of 
fetal remains as required by law.235 And when the Eighth Circuit in 
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota upheld a Minnesota fetal remains 
                                                                                                                     
229. See supra notes 92 and 97 and accompanying text (describing the effect of the 
regulations at issue in Hellerstedt I).
230. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (“We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant 
number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred 
from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all 
cases.”).
231. Id. at 874.
232. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 230
233. Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6.
234. 43 Tex. Reg. 466 (Jan. 26, 2018).
235. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 697.005–.006 (West 2018) (requiring DSHS 
to establish a registry to help reduce the costs likely associated with the disposition requirements 
and directing DSHS to establish a grant program).
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disposition requirement in 1990, the court credited evidence that hospitals 
had been disposing of remains at a cost of approximately $40–60 per 
month. According to the appeals court, “[e]ven if a portion of that cost 
[were] passed along to the woman obtaining the abortion,” it would not 
be impermissible given the Supreme Court’s previous conclusion in 
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft that “costs 
of up to $19.40 per patient [would] not create a burden sufficient to strike 
down an abortion regulation.”236 Thus, while the Hellerstedt II court 
found that the costs associated with the Texas fetal remains disposition 
requirements were likely burdensome, there certainly is evidence that 
suggests that the burdens may not be of such magnitude that the 
requirements run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
The court in Hellerstedt II added, however, that the DSHS 
amendments could deal “a major, if not fatal blow to health care providers 
performing abortions.”237 And admittedly, if a fetal remains disposition
requirement were to result in clinic closures in numbers comparable to 
                                                                                                                     
236. Planned Parenthood of Minn., 910 F.2d at 487 (citing Planned Parent Ass’n of Kan.
City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1983)).
237. Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 232. See Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6 
(indicating that, if there are a limited number of vendors, the Texas statute “would threaten the 
continued availability of abortion services”). The court noted that “one women’s healthcare 
provider testified its center was nearly forced to close after two successive medical waste vendors 
dropped the healthcare facility as a client following harassment by anti-abortion activists.” 
Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231; Hellerstedt II (order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6–7.  The court, 
however, doesn’t take into account the possibility that the opposition was motivated by the way 
in which fetal remains then were being disposed of and that abortion foes who favor fetal remains 
disposition requirements may be less likely to pressure those who are disposing of remains as 
Texas now would require. In fact, the court notes that the Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops 
had offered to assist in interment of fetal tissue, and it “exhausts credulity” to believe that the 
Texas bishops would experience the hostility that the Texas district court feared. Hellerstedt II,
231 F. Supp. 3d at 231.
The district court in Hellerstedt II also expressed concern about the number of vendors who 
would be available to provide for disposition. See Hellerstedt II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (indicating 
that the two possible vendors that the parties identified had permitting problems); Hellerstedt II 
(order), 2018 BL 30317, at *6 (suggesting there may be a “limited number of vendors” available 
to dispose of fetal remains as required by the Texas statute). And a spokesman for the Texas State 
Funeral Directors contended that the DSHS amendments created much uncertainty for funeral 
homes in the state. See Wade Goodwyn, Funeral Directors Weigh in on Texas Rule Requiring 
Burial of Fetal Remains, NPR, Dec. 12, 2016 (“When Gov. Greg Abbott first proposed the new 
regulations . . . , funeral home directors went to Austin to convey their apprehensions.”). Funeral 
directors and cemeteries in Indiana also have indicated concern about what it would take to
implement Indiana’s law, but representatives of the Indiana Funeral Directors Association and 
an organization of the state’s cemeteries have expressed support for the law. See Emma Green, 
State-Mandated Mourning for Aborted Fetuses, THE ATLANTIC, May 14, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/state-mandated-mourning-for-aborted-
fetuses/482688/ [https://perma.cc/8DBC-5KDM] (discussing various reactions to Indiana fetal 
remains disposition statute).   
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those that led the Supreme Court in Hellerstedt I to strike down Texas’s 
admitting privileges and ambulatory surgery center requirements,238 there 
would be serious questions about whether the disposition requirement 
could survive a constitutional challenge. But what occurred in the years 
following Minnesota’s 1987 adoption of a fetal remains disposition 
requirement similar to those in Indiana and Texas is instructive on this 
point. Rather than decreasing, the number of abortion providers in 
Minnesota actually increased from 13 to 14 between 1988 and 1992, a 
period in which the abortion rate in the state was decreasing.239 Thus, 
while the impact of fetal remains disposition requirements may vary from 
state to state, if the experience of Minnesota is representative, such 
requirements would not be expected to affect abortion access in the way 
that troubled the Court in Hellerstedt I.
D. The Louisiana Statute
Like the DSHS regulations and the Indiana and Texas statutes, the 
Louisiana statute currently subject to challenge in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana requires physicians to 
dispose of aborted fetuses by burial and interment.240 It does so, however, 
in substantially same way as the Louisiana law that the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana struck down in 
Edwards. 241
For the most recent Louisiana statute, though, the advent of Casey’s 
undue burden test solves some of the problems that plagued the fetal 
remains disposition requirement at issue in Edwards and the later 
Louisiana requirement the Eastern District declared unconstitutional in 
Treen. For example, regardless of whatever other interests the new 
                                                                                                                     
238. See supra notes 92 & 97 and accompanying text (discussing Hellerstedt I)
239. See Stanley K. Henshaw and Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States, 
1991 and 1992, 26 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 102, 105 (May-June 1994), available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2136033.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae032bff485be2469b41902
474589be66 [https://perma.cc/Q4FX-WCY6] (indicating that the number of abortion providers in 
Minnesota in 1992 was 14 and had increased by 1 since 1988 and that the abortion rate per 1,000 
women aged 15-44 in Minnesota was 18.2 in 1988 and 15.6 in 1992).
240. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25(A) (2016) (requiring abortion providers to ensure that 
fetal remains are disposed of in the same manner as other human remains); LA. STAT. ANN. (2018) 
§ 8:651 (requiring that human remains be “decently interred or cremated”). 
241. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards). Compare
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 n.129 (E.D. La. 1980) (indicating that the statute 
at issue in the case stated: “Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion upon a 
pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a manner 
consistent with the disposal of human remains as provided by R.S. 8:651 through 8:662.”); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25(A) (2016) (“Each physician who performs or induces an abortion which 
does not result in a live birth shall insure that the remains of the child are disposed of by interment 
or cremation, in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 8:651 et seq.”). 
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Louisiana law might serve, the state’s interest in protecting potential life 
stands as a firm foundation for the law.242 Moreover, Webster, Casey, and 
Gonzales all make clear that the ruling in Roe that a fetus does not 
constitute a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
bar the state from expressing its view about when life begins in an effort 
to encourage childbirth over abortion.243 Finally, in Casey and Gonzales,
the Court emphasized its concern over the psychological harm a woman 
might suffer if she chooses to have an abortion and later regrets that 
choice, rather than focusing on the psychological harm that might result 
from regulating abortion in a particular way.244
A couple of collateral consequences from Louisiana’s 2016 fetal 
remains disposition requirement as originally enacted, though, presented
potential problems under Casey’s undue burden standard.245 In 2018, the 
Louisiana legislature fixed one problem; the other one, however, persists.  
In contrast to the DSHS regulations and the Indiana and Texas 
statutes, an abortion provider’s obligations under Louisiana’s statute, as 
originally enacted, were not limited to cases in which an aborted fetus is 
removed outside the provider’s facility.246 Without amendment, 
therefore, the statute might have operated as an effective ban on 
medication abortions in which a woman delivers the fetus at home, where 
disposition of the remains very likely would be out of the physician’s 
                                                                                                                     
242. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the interest in protecting potential life as it relates to 
the Indiana and Texas fetal remains disposition requirements).
243. See supra notes 65, 71, & 198–99 and accompanying text (discussing a state’s ability 
to encourage a woman to continue her pregnancy).
244. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s concerns in 
Casey and Gonzales with respect to the potential for psychological harm).
245. The Louisiana statute applies to fetal remains resulting from an abortion, but not those 
associated with a miscarriage. While disparate treatment of abortion may be permitted, the 
Hellerstedt I Court indicated that the omission of medical treatment of miscarriages from Texas’s 
ambulatory surgery center requirement undermined the reasonableness of the requirement. See 
Hellerstedt I, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2315 (2016) (noting that “[m]edical treatment after an incomplete 
miscarriage often involves a procedure identical to that involved in a nonmedical abortion, but it 
often takes place outside a hospital or surgical center,” thereby suggesting that the ambulatory 
surgery center requirement was not “‘reasonably related to’ preserving women’s health, the 
asserted ‘purpos[e] of the Act in which it is found.’”). See also Complaint at 16, June Med. Servs. 
LLC v. Gee, 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016) (No. 16-CV-00444/BAJ-RLB) (claiming that Louisiana’s 
fetal remains disposition requirement imposes obligations only on physicians performing 
abortions and not on those providing medical care for miscarriages).  
246. Contra IND. CODE § 16-41-16-7.6(a) (2017) (only requiring a health care facility to 
comply with the disposition requirements if it is in possession of an aborted or miscarried fetus);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 697.004(a) (West 2017) (applying to “embryonic and fetal 
tissue remains that are passed or delivered” at a health care provider’s facility); 25 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 1.133(a)(2)(G) (West 2017) (exempting from the disposition requirements “human tissue, 
including fetal tissue, that is expelled or removed from the human body once the person is outside 
of a healthcare facility”).
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control.247 And a ban of this type could represent an unconstitutional 
burden to the extent that the procedure may be “necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother.”248
Of course, banning a particular abortion method is not necessarily 
unconstitutional, as Gonzales attests, but sustaining such a ban would 
likely require Louisiana to make a determination that the procedure is 
never medically necessary.249 In any event, Louisiana’s fetal remains 
disposition requirement no longer presents this problem because the state 
amended the requirement to exclude fetal remains associated with a 
medication abortion that is completed outside of the health care facility 
in which the physician administered the medication and at a time when 
the physician is not present.250
The legislature, however, has not taken action to fix a second potential 
problem. Similar to the measure at issue in Edwards, the Louisiana statute 
requires disposition of fetal remains in compliance with the state’s laws 
governing human remains generally,251 and those laws give the 
“surviving parents” of a deceased child the right to control the disposition 
of the child’s body.252 Thus, one might argue that compliance would 
require notification of the father and raise the same concerns that led the 
Casey
                                                                                                                     
247. See Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1053 (E.D. Ark. 2017) (noting the 
plaintiff’s claim that an Arkansas fetal remains disposition law would require him to stop 
performing medication abortions); Complaint at 16, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 136 S. Ct. 
1354 (2016) (No. 16-CV-00444/BAJ-RLB) (asserting that Louisiana’s fetal remains disposition 
requirement may bar “first trimester medication abortion[s].”).
248. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007).
249. See id. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over 
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the 
availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”).
250. See H.B. 273, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018) (amending Louisiana’s fetal remains 
disposition statute).
251. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25(A) (2016) (requiring interment or cremation in 
compliance with statute generally providing for disposal of human remains). Apparently, 
requiring disposition in like manner as other human remains would have satisfied the court in 
PPINK, assuming it had determined that Indiana had a legitimate interest in doing so. See PPINK,
265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 872 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (emphasizing ways in which Indiana’s fetal remains 
disposition requirement treats fetal tissue in a manner that is different from how Indiana law treat 
other human remains). 
252. LA. STAT. ANN. § 8:655(A)(5) (2016).
253. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992) (evaluating 
and ultimately determining unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute requiring pre-abortion 
notification of a pregnant woman’s husband); Hopkins, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (determining that 
a fetal remains disposition requirement effectively required “notice to the other ‘parent’” and 
thereby created an unconstitutional burden on a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion). 
The Louisiana statute allows for a court to determine the disposition of human remains “if the 
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CONCLUSION
In the wake of Hellerstedt I, fetal remains disposition requirements 
like those adopted in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas may become 
increasingly popular among states that want to reduce the incidence of 
abortion. Whether these statutes unconstitutionally infringe on a 
woman’s right to choose abortion, as recognized by Roe, is not a question 
to which Hellerstedt I provides a direct answer. The Hellerstedt I Court 
did not consider whether and how the balancing test it found in Casey 
might apply when a state seeks to protect potential life. Consequently, to 
understand how to evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation founded 
on that interest, one must look through Hellerstedt I to Casey itself and 
to the Court’s decision to uphold the federal partial-birth abortion ban in 
Gonzales.
When doing so, it becomes apparent that the mere possibility that an 
abortion regulation could encourage a woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion is sufficient to sustain the regulation under Casey’s undue 
burden standard and that such a regulation will not violate that standard 
unless the burdens the regulation imposes constitute a “substantial 
obstacle” to a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion.254 The 
district courts in PPINK and Hellerstedt II correctly pointed out that a 
fetal remains disposition requirement can do nothing to protect the life of 
an aborted fetus, but those courts miss the point. By requiring health care
facilities to treat the remains of aborted and miscarried fetuses in a 
manner similar to how the remains of born human beings are treated, the 
state expresses its view of when life begins and thus advances its interest 
in protecting potential life by contributing to a “dialogue that [will] better 
inform[] the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant 
                                                                                                                     
authorization of the person or persons with the right to control disposition cannot be obtained.” 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 8:655(E) (2016). Given that Casey bars spousal notification requirements, one 
might argue that the right of the father “cannot be obtained,” but even so, a court might find that 
the risk that notification may be required could “deter [some women] from procuring an abortion 
as surely as if [Louisiana] had outlawed abortion in all cases.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
Similar to the Louisiana statute, Indiana’s fetal remains requirement incorporates by 
reference other statutes that give “surviving parents” rights as to the disposition of the remains of 
a deceased child, with one parent who is present being able to decide if reasonable efforts were 
made to notify the other. See IND. CODE § 16-34-3-4(c) (2017) (providing for the application of 
certain laws “concerning the authorization of disposition of human remains,” which laws grant 
rights to the parents of a deceased child), invalidated by Planned Parenthood of Ind. and Ky. v. 
Comm’r, 888 F.3d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 2018). Given that the Indiana law specifically gives “[a] 
pregnant woman who has an abortion … the right to determine the final disposition of the aborted 
fetus,” however, the more specific statute should override the general ones incorporated by 
reference, thereby reducing the potential that the law will be interpreted to require consultation 
with the father. IND. CODE § 16-34-3-2(a) (2017).
254. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a 
decision to elect . . . abortion.255 Indeed, the very existence of fetal 
remains disposition requirements like those adopted in Indiana, Texas, 
and Louisiana might cause a woman to choose not to have an abortion, 
and, so long as they do not operate in a manner that would preclude a 
woman from making the “ultimate decision,”256 the Hellerstedt I
balance—if applicable—should tip in the state’s favor. 
By their very nature, fetal remains disposition requirements apply 
only to fetuses who have died. But this is of no moment for constitutional 
purposes. To serve its interest in protecting potential life, a state may 
proclaim life after death.
                                                                                                                     
255. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 129 (2007).
256. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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